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INTRODUCTION 
From its inception, California's Three Strikes law1 has gained national 
attention.2 Widely reported Three Strikes cases have involved trivial 
offenses - such as the theft of a bicycle, a slice of pizza, cookies or a 
bottle of vitamins- that have resulted in severe sentences. Such cases 
evidence the media's conclusion that Three Strikes is "the toughest law 
in America. "3 
Despite what appear to be excessive sentences for minor criminal 
offenses, for several years after Three Strikes' enactment, no appellate 
court found a Three Strikes sentence to be grossly disproportionate.4 
With the exception of dictum in one state appellate court decision,5 
California's courts of appeal have been hostile to defendants' claims that 
their sentences violate either federal or state constitutional guarantees 
against excessive sentences.6 The California Supreme Court has not 
' CAL PENAL CODE§§ 667, 1170 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003). 
' E.g. , Crumby Crime: Life Sentence for Cookie Thief, 82 A.B.A. ]. 12 (1996); 60 Minutes: 
The Bicycle Thief (CBS television broadcast, May 26, 2002) (transcript available from 
Burrelle's Info. Servs.) [hereinafter 60 Minutes]; Rene Lynch & Anna Cekola, "3 Strikes" I..nw 
Causes Juror Unease in O.C., L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995, at A1; Eric Slater, Pizza Tlzief Receives 
Sentence of25 Years to Life in Prison, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at 9B. 
' 60 Minutes, supra note 2. 
• Riggs v. California, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999) (respecting denial of petition for writ of 
certiorari). 
' People v. Cluff, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80 (Ct. App. 2001). 
• E.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (upholding two consecutive 25-year-to-
life sentences for stealing videotapes valued under $200); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 
(2003) (upholding 25-year-to-life sentence for stealing nearly $1200 worth of golf clubs); 
People v. Barrera, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (Ct. App. 1999) (upholding 25-year-to-life sentence 
for forging $400 check); People v. Smith, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 9 (Ct. App. 1996) (reversing trial 
court's decision to strike prior serious felony convictions); People v. Cooper, 51 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 106 (Ct. App. 1996) (upholding 25-year-to-life sentence for being ex-felon in possession 
of handgun); People v. Kinsey, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769 (Ct. App. 1995) (upholding 29-year-to-
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reviewed those issues.7 
In 1999 and again in 2001, four United States Supreme Court justices 
raised questions about the constitutionality of some Three Strikes 
sentences.8 The justices seemed particularly concerned with cases in 
which the defendants' third strike was petty theft.9 Influenced by the 
views of the four justices, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that a Three Strikes sentence did violate the Eighth 
Amendment. 10 Leonardo Andrade received a sentence of fifty years to 
life after his conviction on two counts of p2tty theft. 11 Thereafter, in 
Brown v. Mayle, the Ninth Circuit struck down two other Three Strikes 
sentences of twenty-five years to life in two more cases involving a third 
strike of petty theft. 12 Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the 
writ of certiorari in Andrade, along with a companion case from the state 
court, Ewing v. California. 13 
The Ninth Circuit decisions and a subsequent district court opinion 
provided a brief moment of hope for opponents of Three Strikes' more 
extreme sentences. Efforts at legislative reform had come to a dead-end 
as had litigation in the state courts. 14 The federal courts finally offered a 
life sentence for attempted injury on cohabitant, assault and battery); People v. Drew, 47 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 319 (Ct. App. 1995) (reversing trial court's decision to strike prior serious 
felonies to avoid Three Strikes sentence of 25 years to life for possession of codeine); People 
v. Patton, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 702 (Ct. App. 1995) (modifying lenient sentence to 25 years to life 
for possession of cocaine base in order to reflect correct Three Strikes sentence); People v. 
Cartwright, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351 (Ct. App. 1995) (upholding sentence of 428 years to life for 
rape); People v. Superior Court (Missamore), 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392 (Ct. App. 1995) (reversing 
sentence of probation for possession of marijuana when it was defendant's fourth felony); 
People v. Gore, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (Ct. App. 1995) (reversing order to dismiss prior 
felony); People v. Bailey, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205 (Ct. App. 1995) (reversing trial court's 
decision to strike prior offenses to avoid Three Strikes sentence of 25 years to life for 
shoplifting items valued at $250); People v. Superior Court (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 
(Ct. App. 1995) (vacating lower court's order striking prior serious offenses allowing for 
Three Strikes life sentence for possession of controlled substance). 
' Durden v. California, 531 U.S. 1184 (2001) (Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
' ld. at 1184; Riggs, 525 U.S. at 1114 .. 
' While two justices thought that the Court should grant the writ of certiorari, Justice 
Stevens concurred in the denial of the writ because neither lower federal courts nor the 
California Supreme Court had considered the issue. Riggs, 525 U.S. at 1114. 
10 Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
" Id. at 746. 
" 283 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2001). 
13 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
While those cases were pending, a district court judge extended the Ninth Circuit decisions 
to a case in which the offender's third strike was trivial, but not a "wobbler." Duran v. 
Castro, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1128-29 (E. D. Cal. 2002). 
" See, e.g., Assembly Floor Analysis of AB 2447, 1999-2000 Leg., at 1 (imposing factors 
court can consider when determining whether to "strike" previous serious or violent 
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new forum in which to challenge Three Strikes sentences. Optimism, 
however, was premature. 
On March 5, 2003, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's 
decision in Andrade on narrow procedural grounds15 and held in Ewing 
that the offender's Three Strikes sentence did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment.16 The Court was deeply divided in Ewing, resulting in a 
judgment of the Court with no majority opinion. 17 Piecing together the 
plurality and dissenting opinions in Ewing suggests that, under very 
narrow circumstances, Three Strikes defendants may be able to raise 
successful Eighth Amendment challenges to their sentences. But those 
cases will be so rare that they offer little hope for those who seek federal 
help in reforming California's Three Strikes' sentencing policy.18 
Critics may argue that the Ninth Circuit decisions were result-oriented 
and that the court refused to follow settled precedent to achieve 
desirable social ends.19 On that score, I agree with the court's critics: 
Andrade and the subsequent extension of that case in Brown departed 
from governing law.20 Even prior to the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Ewing, the Court's case law was begrudging in extending the 
Eighth Amendment to terms of imprisonment and emphasized that such 
cases would be exceedingly rare.21 Not only did the Ninth Circuit have 
little Supreme Court precedent in its favor, it also had to overcome a 
significant procedural hurdle: because the defendants in Andrade and 
offense); Assembly Comm. on Pub. Safety, Comm. Analysis of AB 1652, 2000-01 Leg., at 2-3 
(exempting drug possession from being third-strike offense); Assembly Comm. on 
Appropriations, Comm. Analysis of AB 1790, 2001-02 Leg., at 1 (narrowing definition of 
third strike); Senate Rules Comm., Senate Floor Analysis of SB 1517, 2001-02 Leg., at 1 
(removing convictions for certain nonviolent crimes from third-strike penalties). 
" 538 u.s. 63, 70-77 (2003). 
" 538 u.s. 11, 25-30 (2003). 
" For a discussion of the decision in Ewing, consult i11jra notes 630-38 and 
accompanying text. 
" For a discussion of the decision in Ewing, consult irrfra notes 630-38 and 
accompanying text. 
•• I am tempted to call both the Ninth Circuit and the state appellate courts "activist" 
in their willingness to ignore settled precedent. Defining "activism," however, is 
contentious. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Conservatives and The Seven Sins of judicial 
Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1217, 1220-21 (2002) (discussing difficulty in defining activism 
and observing that decision may be activist in one sense, but not in another); Ernest A. 
Young, judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1166 (2002) 
(discussing situations in which one form of activism conflicts with another form of 
activism). While result-orientation is often part of a definition of activism, defending any 
particular definition of "activism" would distract from my main theme concerning the 
Ninth Circuit and state appellate courts. 
"' See infra text accompanying notes 132-53. 
" See i11jra note 253. 
2004) California's Three Strikes and We're Out 1029 
Brown sought the writ of habeas corpus, they had to demonstrate that the 
state court decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of dearly established federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States."22 The limited Supreme Court 
cases, often decided by narrow majorities, simply do not meet that 
standard.23 
One can level the same charge of result-orientation against California's 
courts of appeal. In the state courts, defendants argued that their 
particular Three Strikes sentences violated California's state 
constitutional provision against cruel or unusual punishment,24 not just 
that they violated their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel 
and unusual punishment.25 The difference in constitutional language is 
more than a linguistic quibble . 
In contrast to federal case law,26 the California Supreme Court has 
found that numerous criminal sentences violated Article I, section 17 of 
the state constitution.27 The court refined its case law for over a decade, 
culminating in People v. Dillon in 1983.28 There, the court found that a 
term of life in prison for a seventeen-year-old convicted of first degree 
felony murder violated the state constitution. California's appellate 
courts had ample authority to find that individual Three Strikes 
sentences violated the state constitution. Instead, state appellate court 
judges rejected settled precedent, leaving them open to criticism similar 
to that directed at the Ninth Circuit.29 
The respective positions of the federal and state appellate court judges 
may be attributed to institutional realities. The Ninth Circuit's 
willingness to take a politically unpopular position may be a result of the 
judicial independence of Article III judges,30 while state judges, who 
must face reelection, may be more politically sensitive than their federal 
22 28 u.s. c.§ 2254(d)(1) (2002). 
" See infra note 158. 
" CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
" U.S. CONST. amend. VII; e.g., People v. Barrera, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (Ct. App. 1999); 
People v. Cooper, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106 (Ct. App. 1996); People v. Kinsey, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
769 (Ct. App. 1995); People v. Cartwright, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351 (Ct. App. 1995). 
" See infra notes 48-75. 
" See infra notes 255-79. 
"' 34 Cal. 3d 441 (1983). 
"' See infra notes 309-15. 
"' For a more detailed discussion of the extent to which federal judges depart from 
majoritarian sentiment, see Michael Vitiello, How Imperial Is tlze Supreme Court: An Analysis 
of Supreme Court Abortion Doctrine and Popular Will, 34 U.S. F. L. REV. 49 (1999). 
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counterparts.31 But the fact that the Ninth Circuit decision may be 
explained by judicial independence does not necessarily make it correct. 
After all, critics often attack decisions by politically unaccountable 
judges when those decisions frustrate the will of the majority.32 Thus the 
positions taken by the Ninth Circuit and state appellate courts beg a 
further question: who has it right? Had the Ninth Circuit's decision 
stood, would it have undercut a statute that has proven effective in 
reducing crime? Or would the Ninth Circuit's decision have provided a 
healthy corrective to legislative and voter excess? This Article -examines 
those questions. 
Part I analyzes the Ninth Circuit's decision in Andrade and the 
Supreme Court's opinion reversing the Ninth Circuit.33 It also reviews 
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Brown, extending Andrade beyond its 
limited facts.34 Part I concludes that the Ninth Circuit extended existing 
precedent. Even if the Supreme Court should have extended its case law 
to strike down the Three Strikes' sentences, the Ninth Circuit's 
conclusion that the state court opinions in Andrade and Brown were 
"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 
established Federal law" was unwarranted.35 
Part II examines California case law relating to its constitutional 
guarantee against cruel or unusual punishment, and appellate court 
decisions rejecting defendants' arguments that their Three Strikes 
sentences were excessive. That section argues that the state appellate 
courts did not follow settled precedent.36 
Thereafter, this Article asks whether California would have been better 
served by the decisions of the Ninth Circuit or the state appellate courts. 
Part III discusses the penological debate surrounding recidivist statutes 
like Three Strikes and the extent to which long sentences imposed under 
those statutes are morally justified. That section concludes that many 
Three Strikes sentences raise serious moral questions because they are 
disproportionate to the defendant's culpability.37 
" See Paul J. Pfingst, Gregory Thompson & Kathleen M . Lewis, "T/1e Genie's Out of l/1e 
Jar": The Development of Criminal Justice Policy in California, 33 MCGEORGE L. REv . 717, 724-
30 (2002). 
" See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 17 (1990); Jeremy Rabkin, Partisan in the Culture Wars, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 105 
(1998). 
" See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text. 
" See infra notes 168-87 and accompanying text. 
" See infra notes 206-15 and accompanying text. 
,. See infra notes 217-50 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 375-459 and accompanying text. 
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Despite the moral questions surrounding Three Strikes, its supporters 
claim that Three Strikes works.38 Part IV addresses those claims by 
reviewing empirical data on whether Three Strikes caused the downturn 
in California's crime rates. Existing data suggest that Three Strikes does 
not deliver on its promises.39 
Part V discusses possible reform of Three Strikes. It reviews the state 
of the law after the Supreme Court's decision in Ewin§, which forecloses 
virtually all challenges to Three Strikes sentences.~ Further, absent 
action by the state supreme court, California cannot hope for a judicial 
solution to the problems created by Three Strikes. Despite Three Strikes' 
unnecessary cost, few politicians are willing to advocate reforming the 
law. Prominent politicians backed Three Strikes when popular 
sentiment against crime was at fever pitch. Those politicians show no 
willingness to admit error; many of them are dependent on financial 
backing from groups that favored laws that have led to unnecessary 
expansion of California's prisons and their populations.41 Politicians 
who would reform Three Strikes face a difficult task because Three 
Strikes requires a super-majority for its modification.42 Legislative efforts 
to place an initiative on the ballot that would have limited Three Strikes 
have repeatedly failed. 43 As a result, judicial activism may have been 
California's best hope for reform. The Ninth Circuit's willingness to 
ignore precedent had the potential to usher in a modest rational reform 
that the democratic process may not be able to achieve.44 
" See infra notes 460-71 and accompanying text. 
" See illfra notes 472-574 and accompanying text. 
"' See infra notes 631-57 and accompanying text. 
" See infra notes 601-11 and accompanying text. 
" CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(j), 1170.12 (4) (West 2004). 
" See, e.g., Cal. A.B. 112, 2003-04 Leg., (Jan. 13, 2003) (requiring current conviction be 
"serious" or "violent" felony to receive third-strike enhanced sentence). TI1is bill was made 
inactive on a motion by the author and effectively "killed" on July 8, 2003. See also the 
various attempted modifications discussed at supra note 14. 
" See infrn notes 644-57 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE SUPREME COURT'S EIGHTH AMENDMENT CASE LAW AND THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT'S VIEW 
A. Supreme Court Precedent on Terms of Imprisonment 
While the Supreme Court has held that the death penalty must be 
proportionate to the crime45 and has reaffirmed that position in a number 
of cases,46 whether the Eighth Amendment requires that a term of 
imprisonment be proportionate to the crime rests on less firm footing. 
The Ninth Circuit's legal analysis in Andrade focused on three leading 
Supreme Court cases, decided between 1980 and 1991, that dealt with 
terms of imprisonment.47 
Decided in 1980, Rummel v. Estelle rejected the defendant's claim that 
his sentence of life in prison violated the Eighth Amendment.48 Rummel 
was a recidivist who, over a period of nine years, was convicted of three 
nonviolent theft offenses involving a total of less than $230.49 He was 
sentenced to a term of life imprisonment under Texas's habitual offender 
statute.50 A closely divided Court upheld the punishment and observed 
that "the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of 
legislative prerogative."51 Rummel did rely on the fact that, under Texas 
law, the prisoner would be eligible for parole within twelve years.52 In 
addition, the Court did not foreclose the possibility that a term of 
imprisonment might violate the Eighth Amendment. 53 
Three terms later, for the first and only time, the Court, again deeply 
divided, found that a term of imprisonment without more did violate the 
Eighth Amendment.54 In Solem v. Helm, the defendant was sentenced 
" Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) . 
.. E.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 
(1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
" Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); 
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). As discussed below, the Supreme Court has 
decided a small number of additional cases that nei ther the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme 
Court relied on in Alldrnde. See discussion infra notes 160-65. 
" Rummel, 445 U.S. at 263. 
" Id . at 265-66. 
"' TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 12.42(d) (2003); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266. 
" Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274. 
" Id. at 280. 
" ld. 
" Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (suggesting that Weems v. United States, 217 
U.S. 349 (1910), may have turned on form of punishment). Robi11SOII v. Califomia, 370 U.S. 
660 (1962), involved a term of imprisonment; however, the punishment was based upon 
the status of the offender and the Court found that any sentence would violate the Eighth 
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under South Dakota's recidivist statute.55 His prior record, although 
longer than Rummel's, also involved a succession of relatively minor 
felonies. 56 In Solem, the Court found that earlier precedent had 
established proportionality review and that Rummel had reaffirmed it.57 
The Court recognized that legislatures retain broad authority to 
determine appropriate punishments, and instances in which a term of 
imprisonment might violate the Eighth Amendment would be 
"exceedingly rare."58 Nonetheless, it found that the severity of the 
punishment may far outweigh the gravity of the harm posed by a 
criminal offense.59 It emphasized that a court must assess the culpability 
of the offender and the harm threatened to society from the offender's 
conduct.60 Without indicating whether the distinction was a necessary 
condition for its holding, the Court distinguished the punishment under 
South Dakota law from the punishment under Texas law:61 South 
Dakota provided for a true life sentence.62 In South Dakota, the governor 
would have to commute an offender's sentence to a term of years before 
the offender could expect to be released from prison.63 The data showed 
that that power was exercised infrequently.64 The Court contrasted 
South Dakota's practice with Texas's liberal parole policy, which would 
allow an offender like Rummel to be released within twelve years.65 
The Supreme Court returned to the issue in Harmelin v. Michigan.66 
There, the offender was sentenced to a term of life in prison without 
benefit of parole,67 the mandatory sentence for anyone found guilty of 
possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine.68 Despite being 
designated as the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia's opinion represented 
Amendment. 
'' S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 22-7-8 (Michie 1979) (amended 1981); Solem, 463 U.S. at 281. 
"' Solem, 463 U.S. at 279-81. The defendant had been convicted of third-degree 
burglary three times, obtaining money under false pretenses, grand larceny, and driving 
while intoxicated. !d. 
" ld. at 286-88. 
"' /d. at 289-90. 
5'1 See id. at 290. 
~~ ld. at 292-94. 
61 /d. at 297. 
62 /d. at 282. 
"' S.D. CONST. art. IV,§ 3 . 
.. Solem, 463 U.S. at 303 n.29. 
65 /d . at 301-03 . 
.. 501 u.s. 957 (1991). 
" ld. at 961. 
"" MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 333.7403(2)(a)(i ) (2001). 
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only his and the Chief Justice's view.69 Scalia would have overruled 
Solem v. Helm and held that, outside the area of capital sentencing, Eighth 
Amendment challenges are limited to the method of punishment, not to 
a term of imprisonment.70 
Justice White, who dissented in Solem, reversed his position in 
Harmelin.71 In addition, Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens 
refused to overrule Solem. n They argued that Solem was controllin~ and 
that the sentence before the Court violated the Eighth Amendment.7 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, agreed that 
the Court should not overrule Solem.74 But they voted with Justice Scalia 
and the Chief Justice to find that the sentence was constitutional.75 
Later in Andrade, the Ninth Circuit relied on Justice Kennedy's 
concurring opinion in Harmelin as stating the current controlling legal 
standard, "because it is the 'position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgment [] on the narrowest grounds .... "'76 That 
opinion reaffirmed several legal propositions, including Solem's central 
holding that a grossly disproportionate sentence violates the Eighth 
Amendment.77 The Kennedy opinion also emphasized several principles 
governing review of a term of imprisonment: a court must give 
substantial deference to legislative determinations about proper 
sentences; the Eighth Amendment does not adopt any particular 
penological theory; differences in sentencing are inevitable in a federal 
system; a court must look to objective factors in determining whether a 
sentence is disproportionate; and a court will find an Eighth Amendment 
violation only if a term of imprisonment is grossly disproportionate to 
the crime.78 
Justice Kennedy found that Solem did not require an interjurisdictional 
and intrajurisdictional comparison of sentences in every case.79 Instead, 
" Harmel in v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961 (1991). 
70 Id. at 965, 979. 
" ld. at 1009. 
n ld. at 1009, 1021, 1027. 
" !d. at 1021, 1027. 
" Id. at 996 (Kennedy, O'Connor & Souter, JJ., concurring). In his dissenting opinion, 
Justice White maintained that Justice Kennedy modified the test in Solem. ld. at 1018-19. 
" Id. at 996. 
" Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 754 (9th Cir. 2001). 
11 Harmeli11, 501 U.S. at 996. 
"' Id. at 998-1000. 
"' Id. at 1004-05. An interjurisdictional comparison examines punishment of the same 
crime within various jurisdictions, whereas an intrajurisdictional comparison looks at 
various punishments within the same jurisdiction. 
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only if a comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed 
led to an inference of gross disproportionality would a court conduct the 
sentence comparisons.80 Because Harmelin's crime was so serious and 
posed such a high risk of harm to society, he found no need to do the 
additional sentence comparisons.81 But the concurring opinion made 
clear that Solem was still good law on its facts. 
In addition to Rummel, Solem, and Harmelin, the Ninth Circuit's 
decision in Andrade also rested on a short opinion written by Justice 
Stevens in 1999. Justice Stevens had agreed that the Supreme Court 
should deny certiorari in Riggs v. California,82 but wrote to express his 
views on the use of petty theft as a third strike. Under California law, 
petty theft, ordinarily a misdemeanor, is elevated to a felony if the 
offender has a prior record.83 In turn, once Riggs' crime became a felony, 
he was subject to a sentence under Three Strikes.84 
Justice Stevens found substantial the question whether Riggs' sentence 
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive 
sentences.85 He raised a number of concerns: cases involving petty theft 
"double count" a defendant's recidivist conduct.86 While federal courts 
accord deference to legislative determinations of punishment, he 
questioned whether California was entitled to the traditional deference 
because California ordinarily characterizes petty theft as a 
misdemeanor.87 He also alluded to double jeopardy88 concerns: 
enhanced punishment for recidivist behavior cannot be punishment for 
earlier crimes. The offender has already been punished for those crimes, 
and additional punishment for past crimes would amount to double 
. d 89 Jeopar y. 
Justice Stevens also intimated that Riggs' case may be controlled by 
Solem v. Helm,90 which found a term of life imprisonment without benefit 
"' /d. at 1005. 
" ld. at 1004. 
" 525 U.S.1114, 1114 (1999). 
"' CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003) (stating that when person with 
prior conviction of petty theft who has served term of imprisonment for that conviction is 
subsequently convicted of petty theft, subsequent offense may be punished as either 
misdemeanor or felony). 
.. Riggs, 525 U.S. at 1114 . 
., ld . 
.. ld . 
., /d. 
" U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
"" Riggs, 525 U.S. at 1114. 
"" 463 u.s. 277 (1983). 
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of parole to be excessive.91 There, the Court put special emphasis on 
Helm's crime of uttering a "no account" check, a crime that involved 
neither violence nor threat of violence.92 Petty theft similarly represents 
no threat of personal harm. In the end, Justice Stevens voted to deny the 
petition because neither the California Supreme Court nor lower federal 
courts had yet decided the question.93 
B. The Cases in the Ninth Circuit: Andrade and Brown 
In Andrade, the Ninth Circuit followed Justice Stevens' suggestion and 
found that a term of fifty years to life imposed on a recidivist whose final 
felony was petty theft, violated the Eighth Amendment.94 It also held 
that "the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly 
established United States Supreme Court precedent when it held, on 
Andrade's direct appeal, that his sentence did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment."95 
The facts in Andrade certainly presented a difficult challenge to the 
Three Strikes law. As characterized by the court, Andrade was "a 
longtime heroin addict with a history of convictions for nonviolent 
offenses."96 His record consisted of a 1982 misdemeanor theft offense, a 
1983 guilty plea to three counts of residential burglary, a 1988 federal 
conviction for transportation of marijuana, a 1990 conviction of petty 
theft, a 1990 federal conviction, again for transportation of marijuana, 
and finally a 1991 parole violation for escape from federal prison.97 Thus, 
his prior "strikes" under California's Three Strikes law were his guilty 
pleas to three counts of residential burglary in 1983. Andrade's third 
and fourth strikes resulted from two incidents in November 1995.98 First, 
he stole five videotapes from a K-Mart store, worth less than eighty-five 
dollars. Two weeks later, he stole four videotapes worth less than 
seventy dollars from another K-Mart store. Store employees caught him 
and recovered the videotapes in both instances.99 
•• Riggs, 525 U.S. at 1114. 
" Solem, 463 U.S. at 296. 
93 Riggs, 525 U.S. at 1114. 
" Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2001). 
95 Id . 
"' Id . at 748. 
" Id. at 748-49. 
" Id. at 749. 
99 Id . 
2004] California's Three Strikes and We're Out 1037 
California law treats petty theft as a misdemeanor.100 But a petty theft 
with a prior conviction is punishable either as a misdemeanor or as a 
felony; hence, its characterization as a "wobbler."101 The prosecutor 
charged Andrade's thefts as felonies; and because he was found guilty of 
both counts, he was sentenced to two twenty-five-year-to-life sentences, 
with the minimum terms to be served consecutively.102 As a result, 
Andrade's minimum term of imprisonment for two petty thefts 
amounted to fifty years in prison.103 The California courts and the lower 
federal court denied Andrade relief.104 
While the Ninth Circuit followed Justice Stevens' suggestion that some 
Three Strikes sentences may violate the Eighth Amendment, Justice 
Stevens' short opinion did not mention a significant procedural 
difference between a case in the state supreme court and one in the 
federal system. 105 Enacted to shorten delay between the imposition of a 
death sentence and its execution, and to limit the ability of federal courts 
to overturn state court judgments/06 the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) provides that a federal court may 
not grant the writ of habeas corpus unless the state court decision was 
"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States."107 Under the AEDP A, a defendant must establish not 
only that the state court was wrong as a matter of federal law, but also 
that the Supreme Court had established clear governing legal principles 
and that the state court's application of those principles was 
unreasonable.108 In contrast, if review is directly from the state court 
system, for example, by the writ of certiorari to the state supreme court, 
the Supreme Court may review the merits without similar deference to 
100 CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 487-88, 490 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003). 
101 
"Prosecutors have discretion to charge petty theft with a prior as either a 
misdemeanor or a felony, and the trial court has reviewable discretion to reduce this charge 
to a misdemeanor at the time of sentencing." Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal. 270 F.3d 743, 
749 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing People v. Superior Court (Alvarez), 928 P.2d 1171 (Cal. 1997)). 
102 ld. 
'"' CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667(c)(6), 1170.12 (a)(6) (West 2002 & Supp. 2003); Andrade, 270 
F.3d at 749-50. 
,.. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 750. 
'"' Riggs v. California, 525 U.S. 1114, 1114 (1999). 
106 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000) (stating "(C]ongress wished to curb 
delays, to prevent ' retrials' on federal habeas, and to give effect to state convictions to the 
extent possible under law"). 
107 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d)(l) (2002). 
11111 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-74 (2003). 
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the state court decision.109 
Because the state prisoner in Andrade could invoke lower federal court 
jurisdiction only by seeking the writ of habeas corpus, the Ninth Circuit 
had to find not only that Andrade's sentence was grossly 
disproportionate, but also that the California appellate court's decision 
was a clear departure from clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 
It did so. 110 That is, it found that the California appellate court was 
clearly erroneous. 111 Thus, not only did it disagree with the state court's 
interpretation of federal law, but it also found that the lower court's 
interpretation was sufficiently in error to meet the heightened standard 
imposed in AEDP A. 
The Ninth Circuit found that Andrade's criminal history brought the 
case within Solem. 112 While the court acknowledged that a state may 
punish a recidivist more severely than a first-time offender, it also 
underscored that the punishment must be for the current offense.113 That 
is so because if the sentence is further punishment for the earlier crimes, 
the sentence would constitute double jeopardy.114 
'"" Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24-26 (2003). 
"
0 Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2001). 
m The Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit's reliance on a clearly erroneous 
standard was in error. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-77. 
112 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 758. 
m ld. at 759. 
'" Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389,407 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia argued: 
Having created a right against multiple punishments ex nil1ilo, we now allow that 
right to be destroyed by the technique used on the petitioner here: "We do not 
punish you twice for the same offense," says the Government, "but we punish 
you twice as much for 011e offense solely because you also committed another 
offense, for which other offense we will also punish you .... " 
Id. While justice Scalia was arguing that double jeopardy does not protect against 
punishing the offender a second time, his argument demonstrates the difficult line between 
enhancing a sentence based on past conduct that does or does not violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. 
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Andrade's record was analogous to Helm's.115 The present convictions 
of petty theft were similar to Helm's writing a bad check: the crimes 
were not violent, did not threaten violence, and involved small amounts 
of money. That Andrade was a recidivist, while relevant, did not render 
his sentence constitutional: his entire record, both "qualitatively and 
quantitatively" was comparable to Helm's. 116 Hence, the court found an 
inference of gross disproportionality and conducted an 
intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparison of Andrade's 
sentence.117 
" ' Andrade, 270 F.3d at 761. In his brief to the Supreme Court, counsel for Andrade 
argued that his case was indistinguishable from Solem: 
[F]actual similarities between this case and Solem v. Helm make that case 
materially indistinguishable. Both Andrade and Helm were in their mid-thirties 
when sentenced to life in prison. Compare Solem, 463 U.S. at 297 n.22 (noting that 
Helm was 36 at sentencing), with A ndrade, 270 F.3d at 759 (noting that Andrade 
was 37 at sentencing). Both had received their first felony convictions 
approximately 15 years earlier, each for residential burglary. Compare Solem, 463 
U.S. at 279, 281 n.6 (Helm's first conviction was in 1964; the life sentence was 
imposed in 1979), with Andrade, 270 F.3d at 748 (first conviction in 1983, 
indeterminate life sentence was imposed in 1996). Both had purely non-violent 
prior records, principally financial and property crimes. Compare Solem, 463 U.S. 
at 279-80 (listing "six non-violent felonies"), with Andrade, 270 F.3d at 761 ("all of 
[Andrade's prior] offenses were non-violent). Both grappled with substance 
abuse problems. Compare Solem, 461 U.S. at 297 n.22 (noting Helm's alcohol 
addiction), with Andrade, 270 F.3d at 748 (describing Andrade as "a longtime 
heroin addict"). Both received a life sentence under state recidivist statutes for 
minor offenses: Helm for uttering a no-account check worth approximately $100; 
Andrade for shoplifting $153 worth of videotapes. 
Brief of Respondent at 36-37, Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 Ouly 15, 2002), available at 2002 WL 
1987633. 
"' Andrade, 270 F.3d at 761. 
117 /d . at 761-66. An intrajurisdictional comparison revealed that Andrade's sentence of 
50 years to life is exceeded only by first-degree murder, kidnapping, train wrecking or 
derailing, and unlawful explosion causing death. Id. at 761-62. While questioning the 
validity of comparing Andrade's sentence to those of other recidivists, the court did not 
find any other published case upholding a sentence of 50 years to life in prison for a 
nonviolent recidivist under the Three Strikes law. ld. at 758-59. The court concluded that 
an intrajurisdictional comparison of cases supported a conclusion of gross 
disproportionality. ld. at 761-63. The Ninth Circuit then compared Andrade's sentence to 
the sentences of recidivists from other states and found that the offense of petty theft with a 
prior could qualify for recidivist sentencing in Rhode Island, West Virginia, Texas, and 
Louisiana. ld. at 763. The Ninth Circuit found that while Andrade may have received a 
comparable sentence in Louisiana, that alone would not make his sentence constitutional 
under the Eighth Amendment. ld. It concluded that Andrade's sentence is "so grossly 
disproportionate to his crime that it violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution." /d. at 766. 
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The analogy to Solem seems apt but for one consideration. Unlike the 
sentence in Solem, Andrade will be parole eligible.118 Solem distinguished 
Rummel on the ground that Rummel would be parole eligible within a 
reasonable period of time.119 At least some authority suggested that the 
key difference between the two holdings is that Helm faced a true life 
sentence while Rummel did not.120 That distinction is examined in more 
detail below. 121 For the moment, the important point is how the Ninth 
Circuit dealt with that argument. 
Andrade was sentenced to two consecutive terms of imprisonment. 
As a result, he must serve a minimum of fifty years in prison before he 
may be paroled.122 As the court concluded, "[t]he unavailability of parole 
for a half century makes Andrade's sentence substantially more severe 
than the life sentence at issue in Rumme/."123 Further, his sentence is "the 
functional equivalent" of a true life sentence. That is based on the court's 
calculation that Andrade, thirty-seven years old at the time of 
sentencing, would be eighty-seven years old upon his release from 
prison. By comparison, a thirty-seven-year old American male's life 
expectancy is only seventy-seven years. Consequently, Andrade would 
likely spend the rest of his life in prison, making his sentence a de facto 
life sentence.124 
The argument is intriguing and will be considered below.125 But even 
if that argument is convincing, the court extended Andrade to two 
additional cases in which the offenders' minimum sentences were only 
twenty-five years and in which the offenders' criminal records included 
crimes of violence. 
118 CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667(e)(2)(A) (West 2002 & Supp. 2003). 
119 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,297 (1983). 
'"' See, e.g., Minor v. State, 451 So. 2d 433, 434 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (holding that 18-
year sentence was not unconstitutional and did not violate spirit of Solem); King v. State, 
451 So. 2d 765, 769 (Miss. 1984) (stating that Solem held Eighth Amendment prohibits life 
sentence without parole for seventh nonviolent felony, but does not render 
unconstitutional 10-year sentence for arson by defendant with prior felony convictions for 
aggravated assault and assault with intent to murder); State v. Dillon, 349 N.W.2d 55 (S.D. 
1984} (reiterating interpretation of Solem as instructing consideration of "proportionality of 
the sentence when a life sentence without parole is imposed."). 
"' See infra text accompanying notes 122-24. 
122 Arzdrade, 270 F.3d at 758; see discussion on interpretation of good behavior credits 
infra note 564. 
"' Andrade, 270 F.3d at 758. 
'" ld. at 759. 
"' See ilzfra notes 170-76, 306 and accompanying text. Andrade's briefs in the Ninth 
Circuit and the Supreme Court represent advocacy at its best. That should not be 
surprising because Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, a prominent constitutional law scholar, 
served as lead counsel. 
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Like Andrade, defendants Brown and Bray were each found guilty of 
theft, in separate cases, making each eligible for sentencing under Three 
Strikes.126 Unlike Andrade, each was convicted of only one cow1t of 
petty theft and so sentenced to a term of twenty-five years to life in 
prison. 127 Also unlike Andrade, each had a criminal record that included 
crimes of violence. 
Bray's prior offenses included three robbery convictions!28 In one of 
those robberies, Bray and a codefendant stole personal property from a 
motorist. When the driver resisted, Bray's codefendant pointed a gun at 
her and threatened to kill her. Even though the driver complied, the 
codefendant fired three shots as they left the scene. 129 In the other 
offense, Bray and several codefendants demanded their victim's watch. 
One of Bray's codefendants hit the victim and took his watch, while 
another kicked him in the face and took money from him after he fell to 
d l30 the groun . 
Brown's record also included violent crimes. He had a 1976 conviction 
for two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, and a 1984 conviction 
131 for robbery. 
The Brown court found Andrade indistinguishable.132 The obvious 
similarity is that all three offenders were convicted of petty theft as their 
final strike.133 But Andrade appears to have relied on both the fact that 
Andrade faced a minimum of fifty years in prison before he became 
parole eligible and that his past criminal conduct did not include any 
crimes of violence!34 Not surprisingly, therefore, much of Brown's 
reasoning attempted to explain why those differences were not 
meaningful. 
In response to the state's argument that Andrade was not controlling 
because the minimum term of imprisonment was half as long in the 
cases before the court, the Ninth Circuit responded: Andrade's 
minimum was really just two distinct twenty-five-year-minimum terms 
for two distinct crimes. That he was tried for two distinct offenses at the 
126 Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 2002). 
127 /d. 




"' I d. at 1020. 
"' ld. at 1028. 
"' Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 758-61 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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same time was merely fortuitous. 135 Further, the court found that 
"Bray's and Brown's sentences are not half as long as Andrade's. 
Although their minimum term is half as long as Andrade's minimum 
term, Bray and Brown were sentenced to indeterminate life sentences 
and could serve as long for their single petty theft convictions as Andrade 
will for two." 136 The court stated that " [a] combined sentence for two 
entirely separate offenses cannot be grossly disproportionate if each 
individual sentence is not grossly disproportionate."137 
Insofar as Andrade's fifty-year minimum term was relevant because of 
his age at the time of his earliest release, the court recognized that Bray 
and Brown would be eligible for parole at much younger ages than 
would Andrade. Bray would be fifty-nine years old, and Brown, sixty-
seven.138 Nonetheless, the court rejected the relevance of that difference: 
Eighth Amendment analysis focuses on punishment for the relevant 
offense, not on the offender! 39 Age at the time of release would be 
irrelevant to the key question under Solem. The key question would be 
the offender's culpability at the time of the offense.14() Brown found that 
Andrade's argument concerning the offender's age at the time of his 
release simply made no sense. On that reading, had Andrade been only 
nineteen years old at the time of his incarceration, the sentence would be 
legal, surely an irrational position.141 
The court also dismissed the significance of Bray and Brown's criminal 
histories, which included crimes of violence. The court characterized the 
difference between Andrade's and their records as "somewhat 
ephemeral."142 The Andrade court characterized his convictions of 
residential burglary as "nonviolent."143 "Nevertheless," according to the 
court in Bray, "residential burglary carries a strong potential for violence 
and is treated as a violent crime for other purposes, including under 
federallaw."144 By contrast, Bray and Brown's robberies probably would 
not have been characterized as violent crimes under the relevant 
'"' Brown, 283 F.3d at 1028. ,,. ld. 
"' ld. 
'"' ld. ,,. Td. 
... ld . 
"' The emphasis on Andrade's age created o ther anomalies. For instance, that 
argument suggests that the sentence would be legal if imposed on a woman of the same 
age with a longer life expectancy, assumed to outlive the term of imprisonment. 
'" Brown, 283 F.3d at 1034. 
l4J ld . 
... ld. 
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California statutes when they were committed.145 Only Brown's 
conviction for assault with a deadly weapon would have been a violent 
offense under the relevant statute. 146 
Further, the court rejected the relevance of a history of violent crime if 
the current conviction is nonviolent. The court identified a problem that 
arises in justifying an enhanced sentence when an offender commits a 
second crime similar to his first crime.147 If punishment is for an 
offender's conduct, what justifies treating two offenders differently, one 
who is found guilty for the first time, the other, for a second time? The 
traditional answer seems to be that a person who commits a second 
violent offense shows that he cannot curb his impulses and no longer 
deserves the benefit of the doubt about his capacity to reform.148 Society 
is not punishing him for past conduct but out of a need to protect against 
his future violence. Hence, the punishment does not run afoul of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.149 By contrast, according to Brown, that 
justification for enhanced punishment is not available if an offender's 
current offense is for a nonviolent crime. Instead, the punishment 
appears to be for the past violent conduct.150 Or as stated by the court, if 
the connection between the present crime and the past crimes "is lost, 
then the Double Jeopardy concerns reemerge."151 
Thus, an attempt to distinguish Andrade by focusing on Bray and 
Brown's past criminal records reveals the double jeopardy problem. 
Distinguishing the cases on that basis would mean that "we would be 
punishing Bray and Brown as nonviolent lawbreakers who were violent 
in the past. . . . [T]he sentence would necessarily be 'an additional 
penalty for their earlier [violent] crimes,' for which Bray and Brown have 
already been punished."152 Absent a meaningful distinction between the 
cases, the court concluded that Andrade was controlling and that Bray 
dB I d' • 153 an rown s sentences were 1sproporhonate. 
"' Id. at 1034-35. 
'"' Id. at 1035. 
1 .. 7 ld. 
,.. See infra notes 436-40 and accompanying text. 
"' Browu, 283 F.3d at 1035. 
,,. "[L]egislators may constitutiona.lly conclude that 'one who proves, by a second or 
third conviction, that the former punishment has been inefficacious in doing the work of 
reform for which it was designed' 'has evidenced a depravity, which merits a greater 
punishment, and needs to be restrained by severer pe: 11lties than if it were his first 
offence."' Id. at 1035 (quoting Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 677 (1895)) . 
'" Id. at 1036. 
'" Id. at 1037. 
,., /d. Finding Brown indistinguishable from Audrnde, the court implicitly relies upon 
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C. Overruling Andrade and Some Questions About Brown 
As a matter of sound penology, much of what the Ninth Circuit said in 
Andrade and Brown makes sense.154 But the court was not writing on a 
clean slate. Under AEDPA, the court had to find that the state court's 
rulings "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."155 The Supreme 
Court gave short shrift to the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Andrade.156 After 
focusing on that opinion, this section reviews additional concerns about 
the Ninth Circuit opinions. 157 Examination of those decisions 
demonstrates the court's result-orientation. 
While a narrow majority overturned the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
Andrade, the majority opinion is straightforward.158 It disagreed with the 
Ninth Circuit's two-step approach, whereby the court first reviewed the 
state court decision de novo and then reviewed the reasonableness of the 
state court's application of federallaw. 159 Instead, the Court decided the 
case "solely on whether§ 2254(d) forecloses habeas relief on Andrade's 
Eighth Amendment claim."160 
The Court reviewed the three holdings relied on by the Ninth Circuit 
and found that "this area has not been a model of clarity."161 Given the 
close majorities in those three cases and the lack of a majority opinion in 
Harmelin, the Court's conclusion is not surprising: the only clearly 
established principle is that a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment 
only if it is grossly disproportionate, but that the "contours of [that 
principle] are unclear, applicable only in the 'exceedingly rare' and 
'extreme' case."162 
It then reviewed the state appellate court decision. It did so, not for 
clear error, as had the Ninth Circuit, but only to determine whether the 
the Andrade court's analysis of the interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional comparisons of 
sentencing to find Brown and Bray's sentences grossly disproportionate. 
1
" See discussion infra notes 197-205 and 431-39. 
IS5 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d)(1) (2002). 
156 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). 
157 See discussion infra notes 168-97. 
158 As with Rummel and Solem, Andrade was decided by a 5-4 majority. Like Harmelin, 
Ewing produced no majority, but as with the other proportionality cases, the Court split 5-4 
on the question of the legality of the sentence. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 64-66. 
159 Jd. at 71-72. 
too Id. 
161 Jd. at 72. 
162 Jd at 73. 
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state court opinion was objectively unreasonable. 163 The standard of 
review mattered because the Supreme Court's standard "requires the 
state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous."164 Because 
the Court found that the facts in Andrade fell between those of Rummel 
and Solem, the case was "not materially indistinguishable from either."165 
Andrade may have been sound as a matter of first impression, but it 
glossed over numerous questions concerning which Supreme Court 
precedent did not provide clear guidance. Under the AEDP A, if a case is 
a matter of first impression, the federal district court should not issue the 
writ of habeas corpus because the state court had no clearly established 
Supreme Court precedent to follow .166 In a case like Andrade, such a 
result may be unfair but as long as the AEDPA is the law and 
"' Id. at 74-75. 
164 ld. 
16~ Id. at 74 n.l. As noted by the Court: 
Justice Souter argues that the possibility of Andrade's receiving parole in 50 
years makes this case similar to the facts in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
Post, at 1176 (dissenting opinion). Andrade's sentence, however, is also similar 
to the facts in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), a case that is also 
"controlling." Post, at 1176. "Given the lack of clarity of our precedents in Solem, 
Rummel, and Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), we cannot say that the 
state court's affirmance of two sentences of 25 years to life in prison was contrary 
to our clearly established precedent." 
Id. The Ninth Circuit also glossed over other questions not clearly settled by the Supreme 
Court. The analogy between Andrade and Solem worked because Andrade's minimum 
sentence was 50 years, making his sentence a de facto life sentence. Of what relevance is the 
fact that his sentence consisted of two shorter minima for two unrelated crimes? For 
example, what if an offender committed a series of petty offenses over a several year 
period, resulting in a series of terms of imprisonment? 
Whether a state may stack sentences in a way that violates the Constitution is an 
interesting question. The last time that the Supreme Court considered a similar question 
was in 1892. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892). ln O'Neil, the defendant was charged 
with 307 offenses of selling liquor illegally. Id. at 325. Because this was O'Neil's second 
offense, his sentence under the state's recidivist law required that he be fined twice as 
much for each offense as a single conviction would warrant and that he also be imprisoned 
for one month. ld. at 326-27. If he was unable to pay the substantial fine by the end of his 
one-month imprisonment, his sentence was to be more than 54 years at hard labor. ld. The 
Court declined to decide whether O'Neil's sentence violated the Eighth Amendment 
because it held the Eighth Amendment was inapplicable to the states. ld. at 331-32. 
166 
"Thus, a district court evaluating a habeas petition under [the AEDPA] should 
'survey the legal landscape' at the time the state court adjudicated the petitioner's claim to 
determine the applicable Supreme Court authority; the law is 'clearly established' if 
Supreme Court precedent would have compelled a particular result in the case." Neelley 
v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917, 923 (11th Cir. 1998). "In the absence of a definitive, contrary 
Supreme Court ruling on this issue, it would appear that district courts must look directly 
to the law as established by the Supreme Court." Sellan v. Kuhlman, 63 F. Supp. 2d 262, 
271 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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constitutional, 167 the Ninth Circuit had to stretch to reach its result. 
Brown presents a different set of problems and demonstrates the Ninth 
Circuit's result-orientation even more clearly than does Andrade. 
Because Brown and Bray faced only twenty-five-year-minimum 
sentences that would allow their release from prison within normal life 
expectancy, the court had to deal with Andrade's emphasis on the fifty-
year-minimum sentence, that would prevent the prisoner's release 
within his normal life expectancy. One problem arises from Brown's 
characterization of Andrade's emphasis on the fact that Andrade received 
a fifty-year minimum sentence. The Brown court insisted that the state 
misunderstood what the earlier panel meant when it focused on the fifty-
year-minimum sentence.168 The Brown court asserted that "Bray's and 
Brown's sentences are not half as long as Andrade's" because they could 
serve a longer period than Andrade, depending on whether they earn 
release after twenty-five years.169 Release is not guaranteed. Further, the 
Brown court pointed out the anomalous result that would follow if 
Andrade had meant to focus on the offender's age at the time of his 
release. For example, were the offender receiving the fifty-year sentence 
at nineteen years old, instead of at thirty-seven, the sentence would 
become constitutional, an indefensible result.170 All Andrade really 
meant, the Brown court concluded, was that fifty years for two counts of 
theft (or even twenty-five years for one count) is extremely long. 171 
No doubt, relying on Andrade's age at the time of his release creates 
difficulties for the court. Apart from the example of the nineteen-year-
old felon, other examples come to mind: had a woman with Andrade's 
criminal record, but a longer life expectancy, received the same sentence, 
would her sentence be constitutional, whereas a man's would not?172 Or 
would a two- or three-year sentence for an eighty-five-year-old man who 
could not be expected to survive the sentence be excessive?173 While 
"' At least one commentator has suggested that allowing district courts to follow other 
than circuit precedent is not constitutional. Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(0) of the New 
Habeas Statute: An (Opinionated) User's Manual, 51 VAND. L. REV. 103, 131-36 (1998). The 
constitutional soundness of this system of review has also been questioned in federal court. 
Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 885-87 (7th Cir. 1996} (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
"• Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2002). 
169 I d. at 1028. 
170 ld. at 1028-29. 
171 /d. at 1029. 
tn NATL. CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 49 
NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP., NO. 12 (2000) (finding women have average life expectancy of 79.5 
years, whereas men have average life expectancy of 74.1 years). 
"' See People v. Krauss, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1246, at *37-38 (2001}. 
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those examples suggest a problem with reliance on an offender's age 
upon his release, in context, the Andrade court did rely on the offender's 
age at the time of his release and needed to do so. 
The Andrade court had to bring the case within Solem v. Helm, for it was 
the only way for the court to assert that the case came within settled 
precedent. To do so, the court had to show that the sentence was 
equivalent to that in Solem, a true life sentence, not just a very long 
sentence. Andrade was able to do so because of Andrade's age.174 While 
Brown's assertion that the earlier panel did not rely on the offender's age 
at the time of release makes sense/75 it proved too much. If Andrade 
merely meant to emphasize that the offender's sentence was very long 
for petty theft, the court then had less, if any, settled precedent that the 
176 
state court got wrong. 
The second problem with Brown's analysis was that both Bray and 
Brown faced minimum terms of twenty-five years in prison.177 The 
court's insistence that it could ignore the statutory minimum and focus 
on the possibility of longer incarceration may be sensible, but again, that 
position lacked clear support in the Supreme Court case law. Justice 
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Harmelin treated both Rummel and 
114 Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 759 (9th Cir. 2001 ). 
"' Brown, 283 F.3d at 1028-29. 
176 Fifty years seems like a very long prison sentence for two theft offenses, especially in 
light of California's sentencing scheme, whereby most petty thieves are treated as 
misdemeanants. CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 487-488, 490 (West 2004). But that only begs another 
question: would the Supreme Court find that a very long sentence for relatively trivial 
conduct is unconstitutional because the punishment is excessive? Certainly, the Court 
might so hold. Except for Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), it has never done so in 
a case in which the offender remained eligible for parole. Weems may have turned on the 
nature of the punishment, cadena temporal, not on the fact that the prisoner received a 15-
year term of imprisonment for a fairly minor crime. Id. at 357-58. The Court insisted in 
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), and more recently in Harmeli11 v. Michiga11, 501 U.S. 957, 
996 (1991) (Kennedy, ]., concurring), that courts must give deference to legislative 
determinations concerning the length of punishment and that sentences are 
unconstitutional only if they are grossly disproportionate. Mere disagreement about the 
appropriate length of a criminal sentence does not appear to satisfy the Court's standard 
for finding a sentence unconstitutional. ld. In addition, in Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 
(1982), the Court summarily reversed the lower court and held that the imposition of a 
sentence of 40 years (two 20-year terms to run consecutively) for possession of marijuana 
with an intent to distribute and possession of marijuana did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment. The Court did cite evidence in the record that the offender was a drug dealer 
and supplied drugs to the wife of a fellow inmate, a woman with a small child. ld. at 372 
n.l. But the Court upheld the sentence despite a letter from the local prosecutor arguing in 
favor of reducing the sentence. ld. at 377-78. A court might have been able to distinguish 
Hutto, but some questions are not clearly settled by existing Supreme Court precedent. 
'" Brown, 283 F.3d at 1020. 
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Solem as good law.178 As a result, Brown's conclusion was troubling. 
Rummel faced a possible sentence of life in prison if he did not make 
parole. 179 The Court rejected speculation about the possibility that the 
offender would have to serve his maximum term. Rummel emphasized 
that the offender would be eligible for parole in as little as twelve 
years.180 Hence, Brown was on weak ground when it ignored the 
possibility that Bray and Brown would secure early release. 
In addition, once Rummel refused to treat the offender's sentence as a 
true life sentence, it also refused to find, in effect, that a term of 
imprisonment of twelve years was excessive for someone with Rummel's 
record.181 While twenty-five years in prison for petty theft seems 
extreme, is twenty-five years grossly excessive for petty theft? I think so. 
Many of us would. But based on what clear statement of federal law? If 
twelve years is not excessive for a felon like Rummel, why would 
twenty-five years be excessive for Bray and Brown? No Supreme Court 
case has explained how that kind of subtle distinction could be made.182 
Brown's analysis raised a third problem. The Ninth Circuit had to deal 
with two offenders whose criminal records included significant prior 
violent acts.183 It tried to diminish the significant differences between 
Andrade's record and Bray and Brown's. It argued that Andrade's 
burglary might have turned violent. 184 In addition to finding that Bray 
and Brown's robberies were not considered violent offenses at the time 
178 Hnrmelirr, 501 U.S. 957,996 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
179 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 12.42(d) (2004). 
1
"' Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1980). 
181 The Court did not state as much explicitly, but that is obviously implicit in its 
holding that his sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. ld. at 285. 
182 Some courts have made those kinds of subtle discriminations. See, e.g., Thomas v. 
State, 634 A.2d (Md. 1993) (holding that 20-year sentence imposed on husband for slapping 
his wife was excessive). The Supreme Court has not addressed that kind of question. On a 
separate point, the Ninth Circuit found that the facts of Andrade brought it squarely within 
Solem, and so did not need to spend much effort distinguishing the case from Rummel. 
Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 766 (9th Cir. 2001). Rummel might well be 
distinguishable from cases arising under Three Strikes. In Rummel, the Court relied on the 
fact that Texas liberally granted parole to offenders serving indeterminate life sentences. 
445 U.S. 263, 281-82. By contrast, we simply do not know how California will administer 
Three Strikes sentences. California may routinely release Three Strikes offenders once they 
serve their minimum sentence. But it may not. Cf. In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1972). 
Thus under Three Strikes, offenders may end up serving true life sentences. If that is the 
case, then a case like Andrade would come squarely within Solem. By the time we know 
how California will treat Three Strikes offenders, they may be out of procedural options: 
habeas corpus petitions may be untimely under the AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2002). 
183 See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text. 
1 
.. Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019, 1034 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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they were committed}85 the court had to deal with Brown's prior 
conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, a violent offense under any 
circurnstances. 186 Faced with Brown's record of violence, the court 
focused only on the current felony and assessed whether a recidivist 
now found guilty of a petty theft could be sentenced to twenty-five years 
to life. 187 Brown's treatment of Andrade's prior burglary conviction, and 
its treatment of prior acts of violence, pose analytical problems. 
On the question of Andrade's prior conviction for burglary, the Ninth 
Circuit was arguing, in effect, that Supreme Court precedent overlooks 
an offender's past violent acts to focus on the current offense. But the 
court's only authority'88 was not on point. While the cited case states that 
burglary can be characterized as a violent offense because of its rotential 
for violence, the cited case did not involve proportionality. 18 Brown 
ignored Solem's treatment of Helm's criminal record, which included 
prior convictions for burglary and drunk driving. The dissent argued 
that four of Helm's crimes could not be considered nonviolent: "At the 
very least, [Helm's] burglaries and his third-offense drunk driving posed 
real risk of serious harm to others." 190 But the majority rejected that 
reasoning and insisted that Helm's record was nonviolent.191 The Court's 
treatment of Helm's record is not only inconsistent with Brown's 
assertion that a residential burglary is a crime of violence (and, therefore, 
Andrade's and Bray and Brown's prior records were indistinguishable); 
it also raises the question of whether Solem turned on Helm's record of 
committing only nonviolent offenses. 
Solem did not state explicitly that its holding would apply only in an 
instance in which a recidivist's past felonies were nonviolent, but the 
Court relied on that fact in justifying its result.192 At a minimum, 
whether a record of nonviolence is a necessary condition for a finding of 
disproportionality is an open question. Solem might be read as making a 
nonviolent record an important factor, if not a necessary condition; in 
either case, Solem suggested that an offender's violence or nonviolence is 
relevant to its proportionality analysis.193 Brown ignored Solem's 
JSS ld. 
'"" ld. at 1035. 
187 ld. 
"' Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
"'' ld. at 596-98. 
'"' Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,315-16 (1983). 
'" ld. at 296-97. 
'" ld. at 277. 
'"' ld. at 296 (finding that " Helm's crime was 'one of the most passive felonies a person 
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discussion, the closest Supreme Court precedent on the relevant point, 
with implications directly contrary to Brown's assertion. 
Brown also concluded that the necessary focus is on the offender's last 
felony. 194 To do otherwise would run afoul of double jeopardy because 
of the real possibility that the enhanced sentence would be for past, 
violent offenses. 195 Here, the Ninth Circuit's position makes a great deal 
of sense and was consistent with much of the criticism of recidivist 
statutes.'% But the problem again was that Supreme Court precedent did 
not support this position and certainly Supreme Court case law did not 
clearly settle the issue as the Ninth Circuit would. 
Recidivist statutes that enhance punishment for a current offense 
based on past crimes raise analytical and ethical problems.197 Supreme 
Court case law makes clear that an enhanced sentence violates double 
jeopardy if the punishment is for past conduct. At the same time, a state 
or Congress may take recidivism into consideration when determining a 
sentence for an offender's current offense.198 While Justice Scalia takes a 
narrow view of the Double Jeopardy Clause, he has summarized the 
analytical problem that these two lines of cases create: 
Having created a right against multiple punishments ex nihilo, we 
now allow that right to be destroyed by the technique used on the 
petitioner here: "We do not punish you twice for the same offense," 
says the Government, "but we punish you twice as much for one 
offense solely because you also committed another offense, for 
which other offense we will also punish you .... "199 
Justice Scalia's observations invite consideration of how a legislature 
might justify enhancing punishment based on an offender's past criminal 
record so that it is not a second punishment for the earlier offense. 
Brown suggests some of the ways in which one might justify the 
enhanced punishment. For example, if an offender has committed 
violent crimes in the past and now commits an additional violent crime, 
enhanced punishment may be necessary because the offender has 
demonstrated that he cannot control his violent temperament. The 
could commit' [and) it involved neither violence not threat of violence to any person."). 
, .. Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019, 1036 (9th Cir. 2002). 
,., ld. 
,,. See infra notes 197-205 and accompanying text. 
'" See discussion infra Part III. 
'"" Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389,403-04 (1995). 
'"' ld. at 407 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that double jeopardy applies only to retrial 
and not to sentencing twice for same offense). 
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longer sentence is not punitive, but necessary for the protection of 
society.200 Thus, a statutory scheme may allow for a minimum sentence 
of five years for aggravated batter/01 and a maximum sentence of ten 
years. A judge may sentence the offender to five years for his first 
offense, showing forbearance with the hope that incarceration will deter 
the offender in the future. 202 The offender's second conviction for 
violence is a demonstration that the earlier hope was wrong, justifying 
the stiffened punishment today.203 That justification no longer applies if 
the offender's current offense, as in Brown, is nonviolent.204 The offender 
may well have learned his lesson about committing violent acts; and 
while he still is a criminal offender, he no longer represents the same 
serious threat to society. If his punishment for a current nonviolent 
offense is based on a record of past violence, the enhanced punishment 
starts to look like punishment for his violent past, creating double 
jeopardy considerations. 205 
While the Ninth Circuit's analysis finds ample support in scholarly 
literature critical of Three Strikes and recidivist statutes in general,206 it 
lacks clear support in Supreme Court case law. That is evidenced by the 
cases that Brown cited in its discussion of this point. None is directly on 
point.207 Brown's citation of Riggs is illustrative: the citation is to Justice 
""' Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of 
Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 759 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
"'' For example, in California, "any person who commits an assault upon the person of 
another with a semiautomatic firearm shall be punished by imprisonment in the state 
prison for three, six, or nine years." CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(b) (West 2002). 
"" In California, where a criminal statute sets forth three possible terms of 
imprisonment, the middle term is presumed unless a showing can be made to justify 
mitigating or enhancing that sentence. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West 2002). The judge 
may chose the lesser sentence, if the facts supporting mitigation outweigh those supporting 
enhancement. CAL. R. OF CT. 4.420(b) (West 2002). Factors justifying enhancement include 
prior convictions. !d. at 4.421. 
"" The Ninth Circuit's argument finds support in the scholarly literature dealing with 
punishment. See discussion infra notes 431-39. 
"" Brown, 283 F.3d at 1020; see also discussion i1ifra notes 431-39. 
"" Brown, 283 F.3d at 1038. 
,.. See ilifra notes 431-39 and accompanying text. 
"" Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 395-406 (1995) (holding that because 
consideration of relevant conduct in determining defendant's sentence within legislatively 
authorized punishment range does not constitute punishment for that conduct within 
meaning of Double Jeopardy Clause, prosecution did not violate prohibition against 
multiple punishments); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948) (explaining that enhanced 
sentence for recidivist is not viewed as new jeopardy or additional penalty, rather " [i]t is a 
stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense 
because a repetitive one." However, it is not clear whether it is necessary to view offense 
as aggravated one.); Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 164 (1873) (finding that Constitution 
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Stevens' memorandum opinion suggesting that a Three Strikes senlenct:!, 
with the third strike consisting of a petty felony, may violate the 
Constitution.208 Counting Justice Breyer who would have granted 
certiorari, Justice Stevens' position was the view of only four justices.209 
Elsewhere, the Supreme Court authorized consideration of an 
offender's criminal past, despite its distinct holdings that punishing an 
offender for prior crimes is a violation of double jeopardy. Thus, in 
Rummel, the Court recognized a state interest in recidivist statutes.210 The 
state has an interest in "dealing in a harsher manner with those who, by 
repeated criminal acts, have shown that they are simply incapable of 
conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminallaw."211 
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Rummel Court did not focus on whether the 
past and present crimes were similar. The Court has emphasized that 
sentencing judges have wide discretion in "the sources and types of 
evidence used to assist [the judge] in determining the kind and extent of 
punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law."212 It upheld the 
authority of courts to consider "offender-specific" information in fixing 
individualized sentences without violating double jeopardy.213 Those 
cases did not make the fine distinction relied on by the Ninth Circuit. 
The Supreme Court's statements about double jeopardy and sentence 
enhancements are inconsistent.214 Perhaps Brown's resolution of the 
question, which would allow consideration of past crimes only if they 
are similar to the current offense, would bring greater coherence to the 
area of the law. But, again because of the constraints imposed by 
AEDPA, the Ninth Circuit was not free to resolve the case in light of its 
best understanding of the law. The law constrained it from deciding in 
favor of the prisoners unless they demonstrated that the state court 
decisions were in violation of dear Supreme Court precedent.215 
This section has argued that Andrade and Brown had to resolve a 
number of issues that the Supreme Court has not resolved or has 
prevents offender from being punished twice for same offense, as well as being tried twice 
for one offense). 
"" Riggs v. California, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999) (Stevens, J., memorandum opinion 
respecting denial of petition for writ of certiorari). 
'"' Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Durden v. California, 531 U.S. 1184 (2001) (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (urging Court to review constitutionality of California's Three Strikes law). 
"' Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980). 
211 ld. 
"' Witte, 515 U.S. at 397-98 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949)). 
213 Id. at 399. 
'" Id. at 406-07 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
,,, 28 u.s. c. § 2254(d)(1) (2004). 
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resolved implicitly contrary to the Ninth Circuit's holdings. Hence, the 
Ninth Circuit went beyond existing law in reaching its decisions. 
Motivation for the court's decisions is not hard to find. Sentences like 
those in Andrade and Brown just feel wrong from many different 
perspectives.216 In addition, federal courts may experience frustration 
with the severe limitations placed upon them by the AEDP A; the law 
forces them to ignore what may be an unjust result because the statute 
requires deference to state courts. Further, it prevents federal courts 
from shaping the law via the writ of habeas corpus. But that only 
underscores the fact that the Ninth Circuit's decisions were highly result-
oriented, without clear precedent for their holdings. 
II. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
CASE LAW AND THE STATE APPELLATE COURTS' VIEW OF THREE STRIKES 
SENTENCES 
Shortly after Three Strikes became law, a number of state trial courts 
found that some of the more extreme Three Strikes sentences violated 
California's prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.217 But 
California's appellate courts have been unanimous in their hostility to 
claims that Three Strikes sentences are unconstitutional.218 Whether the 
trial or appellate courts were correct requires review of several of those 
cases, followed by an examination of the leading state supreme court 
cases on the issue. Unlike the United States Supreme Court case law, the 
California Supreme Court cases are numerous and address many of the 
questions unresolved by the federal case law. This section concludes 
that the state appellate courts have not dealt fairly with controlling 
precedent. Like the Ninth Circuit decisions, the state appellate court 
decisions were result-oriented, in contravention of settled state 
precedent. 
"' See infra notes 431-44 and accompanying text. 
217 E.g., People v. Smith, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 9 (Ct. App. 1996); People v. Drew, 47 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 319 (Ct. App. 1995); People v. Patton, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 702 (Ct. App. 1995); People v. 
Superior Court (Missamore), 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392 (Ct. App. 1995); People v. Gore, 44 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 244 (Ct. App. 1995); People v. Bailey, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205 (Ct. App. 1995). 
"' E.g., Drew, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 319; Patton, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 702; Missamore, 45 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 392; Gore, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 244; Bailey, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d a t 205. 
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A. The Cases in the State Appellate Courts 
Defendants challenged their third-strike sentences in a wide variety of 
cases. In a few cases, defendants charged with numerous violent crimes 
simply made implausible claims that their sentences violated the state 
constitution.219 But state appellate courts dealt with a number of cases 
that followed this pattern: defendant's prior strikes included residential 
burglary or other qualifying strikes that, because of the manner in which 
they were committed, led the trial court to discount the seriousness of 
the offense.220 More importantly, those cases involved a third strike that 
was not a serious or violent felony as those crimes are defined in the 
Three Strikes law.221 In some instances, the cases involved aging felons 
whose criminal career appeared to be winding down.222 Despite strong 
arguments to the contrary, the appellate courts uniformly rejected claims 
that Three Strikes sentences violated the state constitutional guarantee 
against cruel or unusual punishment. 
People v. Superior Court (Romero) made headlines when the state 
supreme court held that a trial court has discretion to strike prior felonies 
on its own motion.223 But defendant Romero also challenged his sentence 
as excessive in violation of the state constitution.224 Romero had only 
two qualifying strikes and both involved residential burglary, one an 
attempted burglary. Both convictions were from the mid-1980s. His 
third strike was felony possession of cocaine (.13 grams of rock 
cocaine).225 The trial court found that a sentence of twenty-five years to 
life constituted excessive punishment and imposed the maximum 
sentence of three years, plus one additional year for each of his prior 
prison terms.226 His record included no crimes of violence; his qualifying 
"
9 People v. Cartwright, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351, 357 (Ct. App. 1995) (upholding sentence 
of 428 years to life for rape). 
"" Pntto11, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705 (modifying Three Strikes sentence to 25 years to life 
when trial court sentenced Patton to more lenient nine years to life because his prior 
offenses did not "arouse violence"); Gore, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246 (reversing lower court's 
decision to strike prior felony conviction " in furtherance of justice"); People v. Superior 
Court (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 383 (Ct. App. 1995) (reversing trial court's order to 
strike prior felony). 
221 CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667(b) (West 2004). 
122 Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001) (receiving enhanced Three 
Strikes sentence at age of 34); Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(receiving enhanced Three Strikes sentence at age of 37); Romero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380 
(receiving enhanced Three Strikes sentence at age of 32). 
"' People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628,629-30 (Cal. 1996). 
'" Romero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 371. 
!l'i Jd. 
12(> Id . 
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strikes were from the previous decade; his current felony was for a 
relatively minor drug offense; and Romero was an aging felon, past the 
227 peak years for most felons. 
In addition to the drug cases, state appellate courts routinely upheld 
sentences like those imposed in Andrade. While that case is discussed in 
more detail above,228 its facts are typical of another set of cases in which 
state appellate courts have found no violation of the state constitution. 
Andrade was never convicted of a crime of violence. While Andrade 
had other convictions, only his 1983 guilty plea to three counts of 
residential burglary made him eligible for a sentence of twenty-five years 
to life under Three Strikes.229 Andrade, also an aging felon with a history 
of drug abuse, committed petty theft as his final strikes.230 
The appellate courts' analysis has quoted selectively from People v. 
Wingo, stating that sentencing is intrinsically a legislative function and 
that the "validity of enactments will not be questioned 'unless their 
unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears."'231 
The appellate courts have also cited In re Lynch for the proposition that 
sentences are unconstitutionally disproportionate only if they shock the 
conscience and offend fundamental notions of human dignity.232 In 
addition, they underscore that fitting a proper penalty to particular 
criminal conduct is "not an exact science, but a legislative skill" that 
involves several relevant policy considerations and consideration of 
popular will. 
In their analyses of the facts before them, the appellate courts have 
consistently faulted the trial courts for focusing on the third strike, rather 
than on the offender's entire criminal record.233 The courts have 
emphasized that California case law, in addition to Rummel, has held that 
recidivism justifies the imposition of longer sentences than would 
otherwise be imposed for the current offense.234 In reliance on Rummel, 
227 ld. 
"" See discussion supra notes 97-111 . 
'"' Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 2001). 
llO ld. 
'" People v. Wingo, 534 P.2d 1001, 1006 (Cal. 1975); People v. Drew, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
319, 322 (Ct. App. 1995); People v. Gore, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 251 (Ct. App. 1995); People v. 
Bailey, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205,215 (Ct. App. 1995). 
"' In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410 (1972); Drew, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 322; People v. Patton, 46 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 702, 705 (Ct. App. 1995); People v . Superior Court (Missamore), 45 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 392, 398 n.8 (Ct. App. 1995); Gore, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 251; Bailey, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215. 
m Drew, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 323; Patton, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712; Bailey, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
216. 
"' Drew, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 323; Patton, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 710; Missnmore, 45 Cal. Rptr. 
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they have asserted that an offender's long sentence is based, in part, on 
"the propensities he has demonstrated over a period of time during 
which he has been convicted of and sentenced for other crimes."235 
Typical of this line of cases is the decision of the Fourth District Court 
of Appeal in Romero: "Romero is subjected to a life sentence under the 
'three strikes' legislation based on his current felony and his previous 
convictions for burglary and attempted residential burglary."236 The 
courts have rejected litigants' efforts to reduce the seriousness of 
residential burglary by arguing that it is "a crime that has a tremendous 
potential for injury or even death."237 In applying Lynch's factors, courts 
have found that three strike defendants' records, even where the crimes 
were related to drug addiction and where the two prior strikes occurred 
over time, is an aggravating factor.238 Again, the Romero decision is 
typical: "For at least the last fifteen years, Romero has continually 
preyed upon society. . . . He is an addict who finances his habit by theft 
239 
and burglary." 
Some of the appellate court decisions have rejected the relevance of the 
second and third prongs of the Lynch test on the ground that they are 
optional if the offender cannot prevail on the first prong, which focuses 
on his culpability.240 The decisions that have done the analysis under the 
second and third prongs found neither favor the defendant. Romero, for 
example, dismissed the second prong, the intrajurisdictional comparison, 
by stating that recidivism statutes have long been upheld in California. 
It noted that first degree murderers with a prior first or second degree 
murder conviction would be eligible for the death penalty.241 Finally, in 
comparing the sentence under Three Strikes with recidivists in other 
states, the courts have concluded that "a review of statutes from other 
states demonstrates punishment for habitual criminals similar to that 
imposed by the 'three strikes' legislation is not uncommon."242 Further, 
2d at403. 
"' See cases cited supra note 234. 
"" People v. Superior Court (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364,379 (Ct. App . 1995). 
237 People v. Ingram, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256,267 (Ct. App. 1995); Patton, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
712; Romero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379. 
,. Romero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379-81. 
,,. Id. at 380. 
"" ld. at 379; People v. Young, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30, 35-37 (Ct. App. 1992); People v. 
Weddle, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714,719-20 (Ct. App. 1991). 
"' Romero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380; see also Patton, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 713. 
"' Romero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380; see also People v. Campos, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706, 724 
(Ct. App. 1995) (stating that at least 40 other jurisdictions have recidivist statutes similar to 
California's). 
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they rely on the fact that the Supreme Court upheld a life sentence for a 
recidivist in Rummel.243 Other appellate courts have questioned whether 
intra- and interjurisdictional comparisons lead to objective assessment of 
the excessiveness of an offender's punishment.244 Finally, according to 
the Fourth District Court of Appeal, California's scheme "appears to be 
part of a nationwide pattern of recidivist statutes calling for substantially 
increased sentences for habitual offenders."245 Some courts have 
emphasized that Three Strikes reflects a change in penal philosophy, 
which now relies more heavily on deterrence and incapacitation.246 
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Andrade, but before the 
Supreme Court's reversal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal again 
rejected a claim that an offender's Three Strikes sentence was 
excessive.247 It gave little attention to the challenge under California law 
and observed that California courts have consistently rejected such 
claims.2-~a It found Andrade and Brown unpersuasive. The California 
court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit in its application of federal law 
and rejected what it called the Ninth Circuit's subjective determination 
that a life term under Three Strikes was grossly disproportionate.249 
Further, it faulted the Ninth Circuit for focusing only on the present 
offense, not on the total criminal record in Andrade and the offender's 
history of violence in Brown.250 
Thus, the state appellate courts have relied on a number of premises in 
rejecting any challenge to a Three Strikes sentence. First, they have 
relied on black letter law (excessive sentences are ones that shock the 
conscience and are truly rare), while ignoring the black letter law that 
suggests that some Three Strikes sentences are unconstitutional; second, 
the twenty-five-year-to-life sentence is for an offender's entire record; 
third, past violent acts make a Three Strikes sentence lawful; and fourth, 
the change in penal philosophy weighs heavily in favor of the lawfulness 
of Three Strikes sentences. But as developed below, those courts have 
ignored strong arguments from a long line of state supreme court cases 
that would have justified a different result. 
"' Romero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380-81; see also People v . Mantanez, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756, 
759-60 (Ct. App. 2002); Patton, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 713. 
"' Romero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382. 
245 ld. 
2
4il See, e.g., People v. Cooper, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 111 (Ct. App. 1996). 
"' Mantauez, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 763-64. 
248 Id. at 759. 
"' ld. at 763-64. 
250 Id . at 764. 
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B. California Supreme Court Precedent Applied to Three Strikes Sentences 
The state appellate courts have recited black letter law from relevant 
state supreme court cases, but have done so selectively.251 They have also 
ignored the factual context in which the court has announced those rules 
of law.252 Determining the correct application of precedent requires more 
than mere recitation of black letter law. It requires the court to ascertain 
the operative facts of the settled case, and then to compare these facts to 
the facts of the case currently before the court. This section examines 
each of the premises that appellate courts have relied upon in the Three 
Strikes cases and then explores specific supreme court precedent, 
suggesting a different conclusion than those drawn by the courts. 
1. Exceedingly Rare Successful Challenges 
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and California Supreme Court have 
stated that successful challenges to the length of a prison sentence will be 
exceedingly rare.253 U.S. Supreme Court case law bears that out.254 The 
state supreme court's case law demonstrates that it scrutinized criminal 
sentences far more closely than has the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Beginning in 1972, the state supreme court reviewed numerous 
sentences and frequently found that the sentence was unconstitutional.255 
In Lynch, the court struck down the petitioner's indeterminate life 
sentence for a second offense of indecent exposure.256 In People v. Wingo, 
now frequently cited for the view that successful proportionality 
challenges will be exceedingly rare, the court found it would be 
premature to decide whether Wingo's indeterminate sentence was 
unconstitutional.257 It did indicate that because the particular offense, 
assault by means of force, could be committed in so many different ways 
of varying degrees of violence, a court must review the facts of each case 
'" See supra text accompanying notes 231-46. 
'" See supra text accompanying notes 229-30. 
113 See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-
90 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980); see also People v. Mantanez, 119 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 756, 760 (Ct. App. 2002); People v. Superior Court (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 
378 n.15 (Ct. App. 1995). 
"' Andrade, 538 U.S. at 63; Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
"' In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 935, 940 (Cal. 1972); see, e.g., People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697 
(Cal. 1983); In reGrant, 553 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1976); In re Rodriguez, 537 P.2d 384 (Cal. 1975); In 
re Foss, 519 P.2d 1073 (Cal. 1974). 
"' Lynch, 503 P.2d at 922. 
,, People v. Wingo, 534 P.2d 1001, 1013 (Cal. 1975). 
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to determine the constitutionality of the offender's sentence.258 Its 
discussion indicated that some sentences, even for a violation of a statute 
prohibiting violent conduct, would be excessive.259 
In re Rodriguez demonstrates how much more active than the U.S. 
Supreme Court the California Supreme Court has been in overturning 
terms of imprisonment.260 In Rodriauez, the petitioner had served twenty-
two years for child molestation.2 ' The Adult Authority still had not 
decided how long the petitioner's sentence would be.262 The court found 
first that, for all practical purposes, the failure to fix his sentence 
amounted to imposition of a life term. It also found that the twenty-two 
year sentence already served was excessive.263 Assessing whether a 
particular term of years is excessive is precisely the kind of question that 
the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to answer.264 While both courts state 
that successful challenges to criminal sentences will be extremely rare, 
Rodriguez demonstrates the California Supreme Court's willingness to 
make the fine judgment necessary to determine how many years in 
prison fit a particular kind of crime. 
Two cases dealing with drug offenses further demonstrate the close 
scrutiny that the California Supreme Court gave to criminal 
sentencing.265 In re Foss involved an offender who had a fourteen-year-
old prior conviction for possession of heroin. Upon his current 
conviction of five counts of furnishing heroin, he was sentenced under a 
state law that required him to serve a term of ten years to life in prison, 
without possibility of parole for at least ten years.266 The specific 
question before the court was whether "the provisions precluding parole 
consideration for the mandatory minimum term . .. constitute cruel or 
unusual punishment" under the state constitution.267 The offender did 
not contend that a term of ten years to life would constitute cruel or 
unusual punishment, but only that the mandatory nature of the statutory 
minimum violated state law.268 
258 Id. at 1008. 
"" 1d. at 1007. 
,.. Rodriguez, 537 P.2d at 384. 
261 ld. at 388 . 
,., 1d. 
26J 1d. at 394. 
" ' See supra notes 45-73 and accompanying text. 
"' 111 re Grant, 553 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1976); 111 re Foss, 519 P.2d 1073 (Cal. 1974). 
, .. Foss, 519 P.2d at 1076. 
2(,7 ld. 
,,. ld. at 1077. 
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The court found that the mandatory minimum sentence violated the 
first prong of the Lynch test because it ignored the nature of the offender 
and the offense.269 The offender was a heroin addict, in context, a fact 
that seemingly reduced the offender's culpability.270 While heroin abuse 
represents a serious social harm and may require harsh penalties, the 
court considered the offender's motivation- whether for personal use 
or for profit - as relevant to the legality of the sentence.271 It also 
considered the amount of the drug involved.272 
The court also recognized that habitual offender statutes may lawfully 
increase penalties for subsequent offenses.273 But at least in cases 
involving a drug addict's repetition of drug offenses that is "attributable 
solely to a psychological and/or physiological compulsion arising from 
an addiction to contraband, any increased punishment for a further 
offense can be attributed to the offender's status as an addict and may 
thus be deemed to constitute punishment for such status."274 And while 
criminalizing overt acts attributable to an addiction is lawful, the court 
concluded that "the mandatory minimum term precluding parole 
consideration for ten years is thus cruel in its failure to consider the 
extent to which the addict's repetition of proscribed behavior is 
attributable to addiction."275 
The court extended Foss in In re Grant.276 There, the offender was not 
an addict, but was a repeat drug offender found guilty of selling 
marijuana.277 Grant concluded that "preclud[ing] parole consideration 
for a minimum of five years or more for recidivist narcotics offenders 
constitute[s] both cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
California constitutional proscriptions."278 The failure of the law to allow 
consideration of mitigating circumstances made the law suspect.279 
Foss and Grant emphasized that an assessment of proportionality must 
be made in light of the penological purposes for which punishment is 
imposed.280 Shortly after those decisions, the legislature abandoned 




"' ld. at 1080. 
274 Id. 
"' ld. at 1081. 
'" In reGrant, 555 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1976). 
zn ld. at 592, 597. 
278 I d. at 594. 
279 ld. at 597. 
zso ld. at 597-99; In re Foss, 519 P.2d 1073, 1081-83 (Cal. 1974). 
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indeterminate sentencing in favor of a scheme that included specific 
terms of imprisonment. While that change undercuts some of the 
analysis in those decisions, the court has since cited those cases as good 
law. For example, consistent with earlier cases, both Foss and Grant 
focus on an offender and his offense.281 That is, individual considerations 
of culpability remain relevant, even in cases where the offender is guilty 
of multiple related drug offenses. Habitual criminal conduct does not 
justify long prison sentences without examination of the offender's 
individual circumstances. Both cases demonstrate how closely the 
supreme court scrutinized criminal sentences. 
One final case demonstrates the close scrutiny that the supreme court 
gave criminal sentences. People v. Dillon found that a life sentence, even 
one allowing for parole, constituted cruel or unusual punishment.282 
There, a particularly immature seventeen-year-old reconnoitered a plot 
of marijuana and eventually enlisted several friends to steal the plants.283 
The group armed themselves with weapons and other materials to 
complete the robbery, including rope and other items to tie up their 
victims.284 Dillon knew that the two brothers who owned the land were 
armed; one of them had threatened to shoot Dillon during Dillon's 
earlier visit to the marijuana plot.285 The youths failed in their robbery 
attempt, in part, because one of the coconspirators accidentally 
discharged his shotgun twice, alerting one of the owners.286 In response 
to the misfired shots, the owner approached Dillon. Dillon shot the 
owner nine times, apparently in fear for his own safety.287 The jury 
convicted Dillon of felony murder, a murder taking place during the 
commission of an attempted robbery.288 
The California Supreme Court found that the life sentence imfsosed on 
Dillon was excessive, in violation of the California constitution. 89 Dillon 
emphasized that a court must consider the totality of the circumstances 
relating to the offense and the offender.290 Examining the way in which 
the crime was committed, the court found that the law impermissibly 
181 Grant, 555 P.2d at 596; Foss, 519 P.2d at 1078. 
181 People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1983). 
283 /d. at 700. 
284 ld. 
185 ld. 
186 ld. at 701. 
187 ld. 
'" ld. at 700. 
, .. ld. at 727. 
290 ld. at 720. 
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treated a defendant like Dillon as it would a premeditated killer.291 
Further, the court examined Dillon's individual culpability, focusing on 
factors like "his age, prior criminality, personal characteristics, and state 
of mind."292 The court reduced Dillon's crime to second degree murder 
and remanded the case for resentencing, with possible commitment to 
the Youth Authority. 293 
Dillon demonstrates that proportionality review remained intact after 
the legislature abandoned indeterminate sentencing. Further, it did so in 
a case involving a violent crime and an offender who would have been 
eligible for parole in as little as fourteen years. It also relied on Lynch 
and cited Rodriguez, Foss, and Grant with approval.294 Rodriguez found 
that a term of twenty-two years in prison for child molestation was 
excessive.295 Like Dillon, it made certain that parole eligibility lacked the 
importance that it might have under U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 
Further, Lynch, Foss, and Grant involved repeat offenders; while the court 
recognized that recidivist behavior may warrant longer sentences, it 
asserted that that alone does not deprive the offender of a careful 
assessment of his sentence.296 
Contrary to the appellate court decisions in the Three Strikes cases,297 
the state supreme court has found specific sentences unconstitutional in 
a number of cases and has done so far more frequently than has the U.S. 
Supreme Court. ln those cases, the court closely scrutinized the 
offender's cul~ability; it did so even when the crime involved violence, 
as in Dillon. 98 Drug use, youth, and other individual offender 
characteristics served as mitigating factors.299 
2. Sentences Based on the Entire Record 
As discussed above, the appellate courts have consistently faulted the 
trial courts for focusing on the third strike, rather than on the offender's 
entire criminal record.300 The courts have emphasized that California 
"'' Jd. at 726-27. 
292 ld. at 720. 
293 !d. at 727. 
~~ Id . at 720. 
"' See supra text accompanying notes 260-64. 
,... See s11pra text accompanying notes 269-75. 
"'' See discussion s11pra Part II.A. 
"" Dillon, 668 P.2d at 727. 
m See, e.g., id. at 720-23; In reGrant, 555 P.2d 590, 597 (Cal. 1976); /11 re Foss, 519 P.2d 
1073, 1085 (Cal. 1974). 
""' Cases cited supra note 234. 
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case law, in addition to Rummel, has held that recidivism justifies the 
imposition of longer sentences than would otherwise be imposed for the 
current offense.301 In reliance on Rummel, they have asserted that an 
offender's long sentence is based, in part, on "the propensities he has 
demonstrated over a period of time during which he has been convicted 
of and sentenced for other crimes. "302 
Reliance on Rummel is curious. While Rummel is still good law, so too 
is Solem v. Helm, a case that also dealt with a recidivist. Insofar as U.S. 
Supreme Court case law interpreting the Eighth Amendment is relevant 
to the inquiry under the state constitution, reliance on Rummel proves 
little. Obviously, even if recidivism is relevant, that factor alone does not 
make a life sentence constitutional. Solem holds as much.303 
One might try to argue that Three Strikes sentences are more similar to 
the sentence in Rummel than to the true life sentence in Solem.304 In 
Rummel and with Three Strikes cases, the sentence allows for early 
release. Some courts have considered that distinction to be the 
meaningful distinction between Rummel and Solem.305 Counsel for 
Andrade argued that that cannot be the meaningful difference: for 
example, if that were the operative difference, a state could incarcerate 
an offender like Helm for the rest of his life by imposing a ninety-nine-
year term of imprisonment.306 But resolving that dispute is not necessary 
to determine whether the California appellate courts have it right in the 
Three Strikes cases. The state supreme court case law is far more 
relevant to the discussion. 
To start with, the state supreme court cases demonstrate that a 
sentence with a minimum less than life in prison may violate the state 
constitution. Rodriguez and Dillon both support the view that a term of 
years may nonetheless be an unconstitutionally excessive sentence. In 
Rodriguez, the court found that the term of twenty-two years already 
served was excessive.307 In Dillon, the court found excessive a life 
sentence for a murderer who was eligible for parole in as few as fourteen 
"'' Cases cited supra note 234. 
' '" People v. Cooper, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 111 (Ct. App. 1996). 
"" Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (holding that offender's sentence violated Eighth 
Amendment). 
"" Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 74 n.l (2003). 
,., See, e.g., Minor v. State, 451 So. 2d 433 (Ala. 1984); King v. State, 451 So. 2d 765 (Miss. 
1984); State v. Dillon, 349 N.W.2d 55 (S.D. 1984). 
,.. Lockyer v. Andrade, 2002 WL 31525420, 71 U.S.L.W. 3366 (Oral Argument) (Nov. 5, 
2002) (No. 01-1127). 
"" In re Rodriguez, 537 P.2d 384,386-87 (Cal. 1975). 
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As importantly, the state appellate courts have ignored a number of 
cases in which the supreme court has found sentences unlawful despite 
the offender's status as a recidivist. Lynch was a repeat offender, as 
were Grant and Foss.309 Unlike the position of the appellate courts in 
Three Strikes cases, the supreme court has not made recidivism a barrier 
f 310 to a successful challenge to an of ender's sentence. 
In Foss, the court focused on the offender's status as drug addict as a 
mitigating factor. 311 In Grant,312 as elsewhere,313 the court insisted that 
each sentence had to be assessed in light of the culpability of the 
offender. The inquiry was nuanced, examining each case on its own 
merits. Drug use, the nature of the offenses, the age of the offender, the 
gravity of the offense, and the risk of continued social harm were all 
factored into the court's assessment.314 
By comparison, the appellate courts have uniformly dismissed 
challenges to Three Strikes sentences. Individual characteristics have 
had no bearing; the single factor- recidivism- appears sufficient to 
d 1. f 315 eny re 1e. 
3. The Role of Violence 
In Brown, the offenders' records included crimes of violence.316 The 
U.S. Supreme Court has never resolved whether its proportionality 
review turns on the fact that an offender has not been convicted of a 
crime of violence. Solem underscored that Helm had never been 
convicted of a crime of violence, but did not specify whether that was a 
necessary condition for a finding that a sentence was excessive.317 
The state appellate courts have held, in effect, that a past act of 
violence without more makes the offender's Three Strikes sentence 
"" People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697 (Cal 1983). 
"" In reGrant, 555 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1976); In re Foss, 519 P.2d 1073 (Cal. 1974); In re Lynch, 
503 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1972). 
310 See s11pra notes 255-68 and accompanying text. 
m Foss, 519 P.2d at 1079. 
"' Grant, 555 P.2d at 596-98. 
"' Dillon, 668 P.2d at 702; People v. Wingo, 534 P.2d 1001, 1009-12 (Cal. 1965); Lynch, 
503 P.2d at 931. 
'" See s11pra notes 279, 290 and accompanying text. 
315 See s11pra notes 234-39 and accompanying text. 
'" Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2002). 
'" Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,279-81 (1983). 
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lawful. 318 Even when the offender has not committed a crime of violence, 
for example, in cases like Patton where the offender's only prior strikes 
have been residential burglary, the courts have held that burglary is 
equivalent to a crime of violence, i.e., that it is a "serious prior felony 
conviction[s] having tremendous potential for injury or death."319 
Combined with the appellate courts' view that an offender's current 
sentence is for the offender's entire record, their conclusions that 
violence is sufficient to make a Three Strikes sentence lawful and that 
burglary is equivalent to a crime of violence mean that virtually all Three 
Strikes sentences are lawful. That is so because an offender does not 
qualify for a Three Strikes sentence unless the offender has committed at 
least two residential burglaries or crimes of violence.320 
U.S. Supreme Court case law is far narrower than the California 
Supreme Court's rulings. Yet even the Supreme Court did not treat 
burglary as a crime of violence in Solem, where one of Helm's earlier 
felonies was burglary.321 In Brown, the Ninth Circuit also treated 
burglary as a crime of violence in trying to justify a very different 
conclusion- that Solem assessed proportionality by focusing only on the 
current offense.322 But both the state courts and the Ninth Circuit are 
wrong in concluding that burglary is a crime of violence. As a statistical 
matter, violence is a rarity in burglary cases.323 More importantly, the 
California legislature treats burglary as a serious, not a violent, felony.324 
But even if burglary is a crime of potential violence, the state appellate 
courts are wrong to conclude that that fact alone makes an offender's 
Three Strikes sentence lawful. Wingo and Dillon demonstrate 
that a sentence may be cruel or unusual punishment even if it is for a 
crime of violence. In Wingo, the court stated that, depending on the 
circumstances of the case, a sentence for an assault by means of force 
might be excessive.325 Dillon rebuts the argument that violence alone is 
sufficient to make a sentence lawful: no crime is more violent than 
murder. Despite that, the court found the offender's sentence 
"' Supra notes 235-37. 
,. People v. Patton, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 702, 712 (Ct. App. 1995); see nlso Brown, 283 F.3d at 
1034. 
"" That is so because qualifying first and second strikes must be ones from a list of 
violent or serious felonies. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(a)(4), 1192.7(c) (West 2003). 
"Burglary" is the primary serious nonviolent felony in that list. ld. § 1192.7(c). 
"' Solem, 463 U.S. at 279-81. 
"' Brown, 283 F.3d at 1034. 
, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES§ 210.2, cmt. 38 n.96 (1980). 
'" CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 667(a)(4), 1192.7(c)(18) (West 2003). 
'" People v. Wingo, 534 P.2d 1001, 1007-08 (Cal. 1975). 
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• 326 
excessiVe. 
4. The Change in Penal Philosophy 
The state appellate courts have relied on California's change in penal 
philosophy to further justify upholding Three Strikes sentences.327 Both 
U.S. and California Supreme Court precedent has emphasized that the 
Constitution does not proscribe a particular penological theory.328 In 
enacting Three Strikes, California changed its philosophy with regard to 
recidivists. The goal is now to incapacitate repeat offenders and to deter 
others.329 Deterrence and incapacitation require longer sentences than 
would be justified were the state's goal rehabilitation or were its goal 
retribution.330 
A natural implication of that argument is that a sentence found to be 
excessive based on the state goal of retribution might become lawful 
should the legislature announce a new penal goal. That is certainly an 
odd result, a position that a court should not lightly adopt. Further, 
neither U.S. nor California Supreme Court precedent has elaborated on 
whether such a result would be justified. Justice Kennedy's concurring 
opinion in Harmelin states that the Constitution does not dictate any 
'" In re DiUon, 668 P.2d 697, 727 (Cal. 1983). 
"' People v. Edwards, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256 (Ct. App. 2002); People v. Cooper, 51 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 106 (Ct. App. 1996); People v. Moenius, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263 (Ct. App. 1996); People 
v. Patton, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 702 (Ct. App. 1995). 
'" Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 990-92 (1991) (Kennedy, O'Connor & Souter, JJ., 
concurring); In reGrant, 555 P.2d 590, 597-99 (Cal. 1976); In re Foss, 519 P.2d 1073, 1081-83 
(Cal. 1974); Cooper, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111. 
'"' The authors of Punishment and Democracy argue Three Strikes lacks a coherent penal 
theory. It is "a penal practice without a theory." ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND 
DEMOCRACY 7 (2001). 
The two strikes aspect of the law is consistent with notions of just desert: under the 
two strikes provisions, an offender's repetition of similar criminal conduct leads to a 
heightened punishment. ld. at 9-10. By contrast, the third strikes' provisions are entirely 
inconsistent with principles of proportionality and just deserts. Instead, the three strikes 
produce results that are inverse to the principle of proportional punishment, increasing 
punishment many times more for less serious felonies than for more serious felonies. For 
example, a person sentenced for rape may receive a six year term of imprisonment. If rape 
is the offender's third felony, his minimum sentence of 25 years is only about four times the 
length of the presumptive sentence. But if the offender commits burglary, his presumptive 
sentence would be only one year. If that is his third strike, his minimum term of 25 years is 
25 times the presumptive sentence. ld. at 112-21. Three Strikes proponents argued 
originally that the goal of Three Strikes was to incapacitate repeat offenders. After the 
law's passage, when its proponents wanted to explain the perceived downturn in crime as 
a result of the law, but before incapacitation could explain the downturn, its proponents 
explained the law as one intended to benefit society through deterrence. Id. at 91. 
"" Cooper, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111. 
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particular penal philosophy. In context, he seems to suggest that federal 
courts should not engage in close scrutiny of individual sentences to see 
if they serve a particular goal. This suggests that changing the stated 
policy would not make an excessive sentence lawful.331 
As in other aspects of proportionality analysis, California Supreme 
Court case law has discussed the significance of penal philosophy in 
more detail than has the U.S. Supreme Court.332 But its discussions do 
not support the appellate courts' view that the change in penal 
philosophy makes Three Strikes sentences constitutional. 
Foss and Grant emphasized that an assessment of proportionality must 
be made in light of the penological purposes for which punishment is 
imposed.333 Decided when rehabilitation remained the stated 
predominate goal of punishment, both cases assessed whether the 
mandatory minimum term served to rehabilitate the offenders.334 The 
court relied on the view of experts that sentences of less than five years 
in prison are optimal for rehabilitation of all but the most seriously 
criminal or disturbed offenders.335 Those cases also recognized that 
punishment is justified by other legitimate goals, namely isolation of the 
offender from society and deterrence, but found that a ten-year 
minimum period before the offender became eligible for parole did not 
advance either of those goals.336 
The appellate courts have cited the state supreme court for the 
proposition that it is the defendant's burden to show that his sentence is 
grossly disproportionate.337 In Foss and Grant, the court seemed to 
abandon that proposition to some extent. Specifically, the court stated: 
"Where, on the basis of injury to victim or to society in general, 
discernible gradations of culpability exist among prior offenses which 
trigger an enhanced period of parole ineligibility, such penalty will be 
suspect to the extent that it fails to recognize those gradations."338 That 
is, the court will scrutinize the statute closely if the relevant statute 
lumps a wide array of conduct within its prohibitions. 
331 In context, Justice Kennedy's statement that the Constitution does not compel a 
particular penological theory supports his conclusion that only grossly disproportionate 
sentences violate the Constitution. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, O'Connor & 
Souter, JL concurring). 
"' Grant, 555 P.2d at 597-99; Foss, 519 P.2d at 1081-83. 
'" Cases cited supra note 332. 
"' Cases cited supra note 332. 
~'' Grant, 555 P.2d at 597-98; Foss, 519 P.2d at 1080-82. 
336 Cases cited supra note 335. 
'
37 See, e.g., People v. Pptton, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 702,711-12 (Ct. App. 1995). 
"' Grant, 555 P.2d at 596; see also Foss, 519 P.2d at 1073, 1078, 1085. 
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None of the state appellate court decisions dealing with Three Strikes 
has focused on that aspect of Foss and Grant. 339 None has asked whether 
the relevant goals of incapacitation and deterrence are served by Three 
Strikes sentences. Nor have they considered how California Supreme 
Court case law would treat Three Strikes sentences: as both empirical 
data3-1° and the statutory provisions themselves demonstrate,341 Three 
Strikes encompasses wide "gradations of culpability." Nonetheless, the 
state appellate courts have not treated the sentences as "suspect." 
5. Putting It All Together 
When Jesus Romero was charged with his third strike, he was an aging 
felon with only two strikes: a burglary and an attempted burglary.342 
Leonardo Andrade, a thirty-seven-year-old heroin addict, had a similar 
criminal record.343 Their cases are not atypical.344 Above, I discussed 
how the appellate courts disposed of these two defendants' 
proportionality challenges.345 In this section, I argue that the state 
appellate courts have not followed established California Supreme Court 
precedent. 
Despite black letter law stating that successful proportionality 
challenges will be exceedingly rare, the appellate courts should have 
done a case-by-case assessment of Three Strikes sentences.346 Like the 
crimes in Wingo and Foss, Three Strikes crimes can be committed in 
many different ways, involving many levels of culpability.347 Further, 
339 Many of the appellate courts ignore Foss and Grant. See, e.g., People v. Byrd, 108 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 243 (Ct. App. 2001); People v. Bailey, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120 (Ct. App. 1995). Those 
that cite it do not discuss this issue. See, e.g., People v. Campos, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706, 724-25 
(Ct. App. 1995). 
"" See ZIMRING, supra note 329, at 59 (finding that third-strike felons do not account for 
their proportionate share of violent crimes). Because of the inclusion of residential 
burglary as a strike and the provision that any felony counts as a third strike, the law does 
not target particularly dangerous defendants. ld. at 60. 
,., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(e)(2)(A), 1170.12(c)(2)(A) (West 2004). Because the law 
makes any felony a third strike, the law will apply to many offenders who are not 
particularly dangerous or violent. See ZIMRING, supra note 329, at 59-60. 
'" People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628,631 (Cal. 1996). 
'" Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743,748-49 (9th Cir. 2001). 
'" See, e.g., People v. Barrera, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 757 (Ct. App. 1999); People v. Drew, 
47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 319,320-21 (Ct. App. 1995); People v. Patton, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 702, 704 (Ct. 
App. 1995); Campos, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 708; People v. Superior Court (Missamore}, 45 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 392,393 (Ct. App. 1995); People v. Gore, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 246 (Ct. App. 1995). 
'" See supra Part B.A. 
,.. See supra Part ILB.1. 
"' Supra notes 340-41. 
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the availability of parole eligibility in as few as twenty-five years does 
not make the sentence lawful. A term of twenty-two years for child 
molestation was excessive.348 Romero's twenty-five-year minimum and 
Andrade's fifty-year minimum certainly raise proportionality questions. 
Those sentences do not become lawful simply because they are 
imposed on a recidivist. The court must assess the individual culpabili~ 
of the offender.349 In addition, addiction is a mitigating circumstance. 
Hence, Andrade's drug history, like Foss's, would be relevant to the 
proportionality of his sentence. So too would the nature of the offense in 
Andrade and Romero's cases: the court found relevant that, even 
though Foss sold heroin, he did not do so for profit."51 sr comparison, 
Andrade's theft, related to his need to acquire heroin}5 or Romero's 
possession of a small amount of cocaine/ 53 seem like minor crimes. Their 
criminal histories involved other drug-related criminal activity/ 54 
analogous to Foss's criminal history. The lack of violence in either 
criminal's history would also militate in favor of a finding of 
proportionality. 355 
As discussed above, the California Supreme Court found the state's 
penal philosophy relevant.356 The court looked to expert opinion on the 
appropriateness of a criminal sentence, in light of rehabilitation, 
deterrence and incapacitation.357 On the assumption that the legislative 
goals of Three Strikes were incapacitation and deterrence,358 what would 
experts say about the extent to which terms of twenty-five years to life 
are necessary to serve those ~oals? Consistent with Foss and Grant, that 
inquiry must be case-specific. 9 
With regard to incapacitation, are sentences of twenty-five or fifty 
years necessary to limit Romero and Andrade's conduct? Both are aging 
felons with substance abuse problems. One obvious alternative might 
"" In re Rodriguez, 537 P.2d 384,386-87 (Cal. 1975). 
"" Supra note 281. 
'"' See, e.g., In re Foss, 519 P.2d 1073, 1079-80 (Cal. 1974). 
lSI fd. 
"' Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,67 (2003). 
"' People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628, 631 (Cal. 1996). 
"' A11drade, 538 U.S. at 66-67; People v. Superior Court (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 
379-81 (Ct. App. 1995). 
"' See supra Part li.B.3. 
"' See supra Part 11.8.4. 
'" In re Grant, 555 P.2d 590, 598 (Cal. 1976); In re Foss, 519 P.2d 1073, 1082-83 (Cal. 
1974). 
'" See supra note 329 and accompanying text. 
"' Grant, 555 P.2d at 594; Foss, 519 P.2d at 1078. 
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have been drug rehabilitation.360 Further, expert opinion supports the 
view that both are likely to stop committing violent or serious crimes,36J 
the kinds of crimes that the voters were concerned about when they 
enacted Three Strikes.362 
Not only are Three Strikes sentences unnecessarily long for the 
purpose of crime prevention through incapacitation, they are 
unnecessary for the purpose of deterrence. As considered in more detail 
below, Three Strikes provides marginal deterrence at best.363 
Consistent with Lynch, once a court finds that the severity of the 
punishment far outweighs the offender's culpability and the harm to 
society, the court should consider intra- and interjurisdictional 
comparisons.364 While at least one recent appellate court opinion 
suggested that such comparisons are highly subjective,365 the state 
supreme court held that those comparisons are relevant to the 
proportionality analysis.366 As noted above, the Ninth Circuit made 
those comparisons and argued convincingly that they provided strong 
support for the finding that the specific Three Strikes sentences were 
unconstitutional.367 Despite one court of appeal's assertion that other 
states allow similar sentences,368 the data cry out to the contrary: 
California's Three Strikes law is the toughest in the nation.369 
I have little doubt about why California appellate courts have turned a 
deaf ear to challenges to Three Strikes sentences: the law passed with 
overwhelming voter support.370 That has led some courts to argue that 
Three Strikes sentences do not shock the conscience, given the law's 
"" KEVIN R. REITZ, MODEL PENAL CODE, SENTENCING 16-17 (Plan for Revision, Jan. 24, 
2002). 
"'' Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 395,437-38 (1997). 
,., Michael Vitiello, "Three Strikes" and the Romero Case: The Supreme Court Restores 
Democracy, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1643,1684 (1997). 
"" See infra notes 573-74 and accompanying text. 
"" In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921,931 (Cal. 1972). 
"" People v. Mantanez, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756,760 (Ct. App. 2002). 
""' Lynch, 503 P.2d at 931; see, e.g., In re Foss, 519 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Cal. 1974). 
367 Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 761-66 (9th Cir. 2001). 
,.. See e.g. People v. Superior Court (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 377-79 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
,., California dwarfs other states in their use of Three Strikes Jaws. For example, while 
California's population is s ix times that of Washington, its use of its Three Strikes Jaw is 33 
times that of Washington. ZIMRING, supra note 329, at 19. For additional data, see id. at 21 
fig.2.2. 
''" People v. Ingram, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256, 268-69 (Ct. App. 1995). 
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wide support.371 But ample evidence demonstrates widespread 
confusion about the scope of Three Strikes. Indeed, the law would not 
have passed but for the kidnapping and murder of Polly Klaas.372 
Passions ran so high in favor of the law that no one seemed to notice that 
the Klaas familX withdrew their support for the law because they found 
it too extreme.3 Further, it is exactly that kind of law, one enacted in the 
passion of the moment, that may trigger the need for judicial review.374 
The courts of appeal have ignored established supreme court precedent 
to reach what the courts of appeal regard as socially desirable results. In 
a word, like the Ninth Circuit, the state appellate court decisions were 
result-oriented. 
III. THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE ABOUT RECIDIVIST STATUTES AND 
PROPORTIONALITY 
Recidivist statutes in general, and Three Strikes in particular, are hard 
to justify from a moral perspective.375 That is so for a number of reasons. 
Although courts and commentators have changed their views on why 
society is justified in punishing criminal offenders, retributive justice in 
one of its several forms remains the predominate justification.376 Most 
commentators today endorse a view that focuses on the offender's just 
deserts.377 While a society may punish for reasons other than the 
offender's deserved punishment, desert sets an outer limit for acceptable 
punishment.378 This limiting principle is not simply the currently 
popular justification for punishment; it has deep religious and 
psychological roots.379 
Most recidivist statutes are not retributivist. Three Strikes is even less 
retributivist than most.380 Few recidivist statutes tie punishment to an 
offender's just desert. But penalties under Three Strikes create an 
inverse relationship between the offender's just desert and his minimum 
"' Id. 
'" See Vitiello, supra note 362, at 1655-56. 
"' Id. at 1659-61. 
'" Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (raising concern that legislatures 
occasionally impose excessive sentences out of "excessive zeal"). 
'" Vitiello, supra note 361, at 431. 
'" Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Relzabilitatioll, 65 TuL. L. REV. 1012, 1014-18 (1991). 
'" Id. at 1014-16. 
'"' See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of tl1e Crimi11al Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 401 (1958). 
"" See infra notes 405-27 and accompanying text. 
"" See infra notes 450-53 and accompanying text. 
1072 University of California, Davis [Vol. 37:1025 
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This part briefly reviews the principle that punishment must be tied to 
an offender's desert.382 It then discusses why recidivist statutes and 
Three Strikes are not retributivist.383 If justified at all, such statutes are 
rooted in utilitarianism.384 A utilitarian justification is based on an 
empirical claim that the social benefit (lowered crime rates) outweighs 
the pain caused (imprisonment of an offender).385 Therefore, the debate 
about whether recidivist statutes are justified begs the empirical question 
whether they in fact produce the claimed benefits. Part IV turns to that 
question. 
At various times in our history, retribution has had a bad name,386 
especially during the heyday of rehabilitation in the 1950s387 and early 
1960s.388 For example, the sentencing provisions of the Model Penal 
Code reflect the then current enthusiasm for rehabilitation and 
incapacitation, whereby judges imposed indeterminate sentences and 
left broad discretion to parole boards and correctional officials.389 
For reasons that have been amply explored elsewhere, we have 
abandoned the rehabilitative ideal.390 Before and after that period, courts 
and scholars have subscribed to one of a number of retributive 
theories.391 Retribution was ascendant before the heyday of 
rehabilitation. And, more recently, as observed by one scholar, 
"retributive theory has advanced far in both application and 
,392 
acceptance.' 
While many commentators reject the view of retribution as 
vengeance,393 they find retributive theory more acceptable when it 
focuses on the debt that the criminal violator creates when he chooses to 
'" See infra notes 450-53 and accompanying text. 
''" See infra notes 386-404 and accompanying text. 
''" See infra notes 431-58 and accompanying text. 
'"' See infra notes 454-58 and accompanying text. 
''" Vitiello, supra note 361, a t 419-20. 
""' Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
''" See REITZ, supra note 360, a t 18. 
""' Vitiello, supra note 376, at 1014-18. 
'"' REITZ, supra note 360, at 10, 20. "(T]he original code made virtually no room for 
retribution as a basis for criminal punishment. ... " 
""' See ge11erally F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 65-66 (1981) 
(identifying decline of rehabilitative idea and lack of new paradigm). 
"" JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 16-19 (3d ed. 2001); Herbert 
Morris, Persons and Pur1islunent, 52 MONISf 475 (1968). 
392 REITZ, supra note 360, at 21. 
"' See generally DRESSLER, supra note 391, at 17; Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Prmishme11t 
arrd Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1168 (1980). 
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break the law.394 Basic principles of fairness dictate that an offender pay 
this debt to society.395 In addition, some retributivists emphasize that by 
compelling a person to pay his debt, society demonstrates its respect for 
the offender. Utilitarianism is vulnerable on moral grounds because it 
treats people as a means,396 and rehabilitation theory is vulnerable on the 
ground that it treats offenders as children in need of care.397 Retribution, 
in contrast, treats offenders with respect because it treats them as 
responsible moral agents.398 On this view, punishment is payment for 
the offenders' debts and permits them to return to society, free from 
1 '1 399 mora gw t. 
Works by H.L.A. Hart, Herbert Packer, and Norval Morris aided the 
comeback of at least one form of retributivism.400 Explaining hard cases 
is one of the intractable problems for theorists advancing any single 
theory. For example, the retributivist has trouble explaining why a 
person who steals $5000 does not pay his debt back to society by paying 
a fine of $5000. That punishment takes away his unfair advantage and, 
presumably, pays his debt to society. Most sentencing schemes 
demonstrate competing justifications.401 Hence, in the theft example, 
except for the most extreme retributivist, we might be tempted to 
sentence the thief to prison even if he is able to pay the fine, because we 
want to deter others and we worry that $5000 will not deter the specific 
offender in the future. Hart, Packer, and Morris argued that retribution 
""' DRESSLER, supra note 391, at 18; Morris, supra note 391. Morris explains that as long 
as everyone follows the rules established by society, an equilibrium exists. However, if a 
person fails to refrain from criminal activity, he becomes a free rider at the cost of law-
abiding persons. It is therefore fair to require payment of the debt in forms of punishment 
equal or proportional to the debt owed. 
"" DRESSLER, supra note 391, at 18; Morris, supra note 391. 
"" DRESSLER, supra note 391, at 19-20. 
,., ld. at 20-21. 
,.. ld. at 21-22. Some United States Supreme Court decis ions reflect this view. For 
example, an offender may not have the capacity to act as a moral agent. ln some instances, 
the Court seems to have considered that as relevant to the deserved punishment. One 
example arose during the past term when the Supreme Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibited the execution of a retarded person. Atkins v. Virginia, 563 U.S. 304 
(2002). 
"' DRESSLER, supra note 391. 
400 H. L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
(1968); NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRJSONMENT (University of Chicago Press 1974); 
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRJMINAL SANCTION (1968). 
"" For a thoughtful opinion dealing with difficulties raised by competing goals of 
punishment, see United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See nlso 
DRESSLER, supra note 391, at 50-55, for a comparison of the differences between utilitarian 
and retributivist views of proportionality. 
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works as a limiting principle.402 Thus, utilitarian goals may suggest or 
compel a particular punishment. But where those goals push the 
sentence too high, retribution reins in the permissible punishment. That 
is so because punishing the offender beyond his just deserts is morally 
impermissible.403 The views of Hart, Packer, and Morris remain 
influential today.404 
Proportionality finds support not only in philosophy, but in religion 
and psychology as welL Some retributivists, unembarrassed that their 
position may be characterized as state-sanctioned vengeance, point to the 
Biblical mandate that an offender must give an eye for an eye. That 
deceptively simple phrase is often cited to support measure-for-measure 
punishment.405 Today, only in the death penalty debate do any 
commentators seriously advance the literal application of the 
proposition. 406 
Scholars have cast doubt on the view that Jewish society ever literally 
applied lex taliones. Even a strong advocate of the death penalty like 
Ernest Van den Haag407 has argued that the original Hebrew phrase, 
"ayen tachat ayen,"408 was ambiguous.409 The phrase may have meant the 
''" See sources cited supra note 400. 
"" REITZ, supra note 360, at 21, stating: 
One of the ch ief benefits of retributive theory is that it suggests a proportional 
ordering of the severity of sanctions. Although a crude tool - because one 
person's moral sense of an appropriate punishment can differ enormously from 
another's-a theory of just deserts can at least insist that offenses and offenders 
can be compared w ith one another in an organized way when assigning levels of 
punishment. Moreover, this relational calculus may be performed even when 
there is no useful information about an offender's prospects for rehabilitation, 
the deterrence value of potential punishments, or the likely incapacitative 
payoffs of one prison term as opposed to another. Because such information 
deficits are the norm rather than the exception, a retributive scale can supply a 
default algorithm for punishment decisions. 
"" ld. The Model Penal Code has been extremely influential in the reform of state 
criminal law; 40 states have adopted criminal codes based at least in part on the original 
Model Penal Code. Id. at 8. The Plan for Revision states that the revisions to the sentencing 
provisions of the code "should sketch the general outlines of a program such as Morris's 
limiting retributivism .... " ld. at 22. 
"" Irene Merke Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Lone Star Liberal Musings on "Eye For 
Eye" and the Death Penalty, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 505,508 (1998) . 
.,. DRESSLER, supra note 391, at 52-58. 
"" See, e.g., ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG & J.P. CONRAD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE 
(1983). 
"" Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 405, at 526. 
"" Ernest van den Haag, The 'Lex Talionis' Before and After Criminal Law, 11 CRJM. JUST. 
ETHICS 2, 2-3 (1992); Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 405, at 526-27. 
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equivalent of an eye for an eye.4 10 That is, even early proponents of lex 
taliones did not take it literally.411 This approach is certainly more 
consistent with the way in which modern civilized societies would apply 
the principle.412 
Some scholars argue that the principle was merely a rule governing 
compensation, not criminal law.413 Others, who argue that it was a 
principle of criminal law relevant to criminal punishment, see in the 
principle both a moral obligation to punish and a principle of 
proportionality.414 Hence, a person who takes an eye may have to give 
back to society the equivalent of an eye (measured in some term of 
money or years), but it would be immoral for society to demand more 
than the equivalent of an eye. 
Empirical studies suggest that proportionality resonates 
psychologically. That is, we may be psychologically wired to believe 
that punishment should be proportional. Kalven and Zeisel's classic jury 
study supports the view that lay people adhere to the principle of 
proportionality.415 The study, covering over 155 categories of crimes, 
involving 3,576 jury cases and 550 judges, measured disagreement 
between judges and juries.416 While judges and juries agreed in about 
three-quarters of the cases, the reasons for their disagreement were 
instructive.417 Often juries acquitted, where judges would have 
convicted, when the jury believed that the punishment would be too 
418 
severe. 
Other empirical research has found popular support for 
proportionality. Against the backdrop of the political rhetoric of the 
1990s that called for tougher prison sentences, Georgetown Professor 
Finkel hypothesized that the lay person's sense of justice is more 
"
0 Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 405, at 526-29. 
"'' Id. 
"' Van den Haag, supra note 409, at 2. 
4 11 ld. at 2-3. 
"' See generally Mark Alden James, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis: The 
Limits of Moral Inquiry, 26 ARJZ. L. REv. 871 {1984). 
"' HARRYKALVEN & HANSZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 62 {Boston, Little, Brown 1966). 
' " !d. at 33-54 (discussing methodology and research design). 
" ' !d. at 55-65 (discussing patterns of disagreement between jury and judge). 
"' Id. at 62. Furthermore, in Three Strikes cases, juries are not told that the offender 
faces a Three Strikes sentence. But they may realize that Three Strikes applies when they 
are asked to find that the offender has previous convictions. Some jurors have refused to 
make those findings because of their belief that a term of 25 years to life is unjust. See infra 
notes 419-27 and accompanying text; ZIMRJNG ET AL., supra note 329, at 201 (discussing jury 
attitude in choice of penalty). 
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nuanced than were the punishments reflected in the law.419 He 
attempted to measure whether the public in fact desired longer and more 
severe punishments regardless of the crime committed, or whether the 
public favored individualized punishment.420 His empirical work 
1 421 suggested the atter. 
Finkel designed his study to gauge mock jurors' sense of 
proportionality in sentencing and to measure how their attitudes 
changed when he introduced different variables into the mix.422 He 
presented mock jurors with the facts of Solem and a similar made-up case 
that changed the nature of the offender's prior crimes.423 He then varied 
six conditions, as described in the footnote below.424 For example, in one 
variation, jurors were given no legal guidelines; in the next variation, 
they received legal guidelines and information on the typical 
punishment that would apply upon a finding of guilt.425 According to 
Finkel, the mock jurors had a sense of proportional punishment.426 While 
the mock jurors would punish a repeat offender more severely than a 
first-time offender, they refrained from the lengthy sentences imposed in 
statutes like Three Strikes.427 
"' See generally NORMAN]. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE (2001). 
"" Id. at 146-50. 
'
2
' ld. at 148-50. 
" ' !d. at 149-50. 
"" ld. at 146-50. 
"' Norman J. Finkel et al., Recidivism, Proportionalism, and Individualized Punishment, 39 
AM. BEHAVIORAL SciENTIST 474 (1996). The six conditions controlled for different variables. 
In condition one, the jurors received information only on defendant's current crime and 
received no sentencing guidelines. In condition two, jurors received information on all 
seven crimes, but received no sentencing guidelines. In condition three, mock jurors had 
information on all seven crimes and guidelines on sentencing. In condition four, all 
variables used in condition three were given to mock jurors. Defendant's recidivist status 
was given special emphasis. In condition five, all variables used in condition three were 
given to mock jurors. Defendant's psychiatric disorder, however, was given special 
emphasis. In condition six, all variables used in condition three were given to mock jurors. 
However, the prosecution emphasized defendant's recidivist status, while defense 
emphasized psychiatric disorder. 
"' ld. at 480-85. 
'
26 Id. 
"' Id. Finkel's study has obvious methodological flaws. Most obvious is that his 
sample population was not randomly selected . College sophomores at a highly 
competitive university are hardly a representative sample. Further, the participants, 
students in an abnormal psychology class, are self-selected. Despite that, Finkel's results 
are consistent with other studies, suggesting its validity. See Joshua Dressler, Peter N. 
Thompson & Stanley Wasserman, Effect of Legal Education Upon Perceptions of Crime 
Seriousness: A Response to Rummel v. Estelle, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1247, 1277-78 (1982) 
(concluding that while legal education has some effect on perceptions of tested subjects to 
seriousness of crime, that effect is matter of degree, not kind). 
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I do not want to oversimplify the debate about proportionality. 
Pragmatic difficulties exist in assessing whether a particular term of 
imprisonment is proportional to a particular crime; people may differ in 
their ranking of the seriousness of different criminal offenses.428 While 
both utilitarians and retributivists argue in favor of proportionality, the 
meaning of proportional punishment is different depending on whether 
one is a retributivist or utilitarian.429 Despite that, broad consensus exists 
that proportionality matters and is a fundamental value with religious 
and psychological underpinnings.430 
Supporters have difficulty justifying recidivist statutes as being 
consistent with retributive principles. That is so for at least two reasons. 
First, recidivist statutes require that the court look to an offender's entire 
record.431 But in most cases, the offender has already been punished for 
past offenses. Punishing him for that conduct violates double 
jeopardy.432 In retributivist terms, he has already paid his debt to society 
and now reenters society without moral guilt or stigma.433 If he is not 
being punished for past conduct, proponents have difficulty explaining 
why his sentence should be enhanced as severely as many recidivist 
statutes require or permit. Sentencing an offender to twenty-five years 
to life for each petty theft, as in Andrade or Bray, cannot be justified from 
a retributivist perspective by referring to past conduct.434 No one would 
argue that a term of twenty-five years is the rough equivalent of the loss 
of eighty-five dollars in videotapes.435 
"' DRESSLER, supra note 391, at 49-55; see REITZ, supra note 360. 
'" DRESSLER, supra note 391, at 22. 
"" Indeed, while the Supreme Court has eschewed adopting any particular penological 
or philosophical theory of punishment as a matter of constitu tional law, Solem and Harmel in 
demonstrate pa rallels to the prevailing view of punishment that emerged during the 1970s. 
Under those cases, states are free to adopt relatively wide ranges of punishment to advance 
different goals. But punishment has outer limits; a punishment becomes grossly 
disproportionate when it is not tied to the culpability of the offender and the harm caused 
to society. That is, a t some point, punishment that far exceeds the offender's just deserts is 
unconstitutional. MORRIS, supra note 400, at 73. 
"' CAL. PENA L CODE§ 667 (Deering 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 22-7-8 (Michie 2003). 
"' See Riggs v. California, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999). 
'" DRESSLER, supra note 391, at 18. 
'" Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002). 
" ' Here it is important to distinguish between sentences that are immoral and those 
that are unconstitutional. While Solem and Hnrmelin seem to adopt a similar view of 
punishment to several moral philosophers (where an offender's culpability serves as an 
outer lim it on his punishment), the Supreme Court's test requires gross disproportionality; 
and, under its approach, courts must uphold sentences that may be extreme, but are not 
grossly so. The d ifference is best explained by a number of factors. Thus, the Court's 
deference to legislatures' decisions about appropriate punishment is justified by federalism 
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Second, while a plausible claim can be made that some enhancement is 
justified consistent with retributivist principles, most recidivist statutes 
go far beyond the limited justification of enhanced sentencing. Andrew 
von Hirsch makes the best argument in support of enhancing criminal 
sentences for repeat offenders.436 A repeat offender is more culpable 
when he repeats his crime: the second-time offender knows what the 
law is and that the law is directed at him.437 Von Hirsch argues further 
that a repeat offender suffers a "progressive loss of mitigation."438 That 
is, when an offender commits his first criminal act, a lesser punishment 
may be warranted because his crime may be uncharacteristic of his 
normal behavior. Repeated criminal acts suggest that an offender is not 
deserving of continued mitigation.439 
Von Hirsch's argument works best when the offender commits a 
similar crime a second time. For example, an offender might reasonably 
claim that he was unaware that society viewed use or sale of marijuana 
particularly seriously. Upon his conviction and sentence for that offense, 
he is now on notice that society does regard that conduct as a crime. The 
argument makes less sense if the first offense is dissimilar to the second 
offense; for example, assume that the first crime is a serious felony like 
assault and the second offense is possession of marijuana. After the 
conviction and punishment for the first offense, the offender may be on 
notice that society treats violent crimes seriously. But the offender's 
earlier prosecution for assault does not put him on notice that society 
regards possession of marijuana as a serious offense.440 
Von Hirsch's argument is most compelling, then, when the two crimes 
are similar in nature. But many recidivist statutes do not make the subtle 
distinctions reflected in von Hirsch's theory. Instead, statutes like the 
ones in South Dakota, Texas, and California441 do not augment 
concerns and by concerns about exerc1smg subjective values (where, for example, 
individuals can disagree about an appropriate punishment, judges are in no better position 
than legislators to decide on the appropriate sentence). Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 
n.17 (1983) (explaining federalism concerns). The effect of a decision that invites close 
scrutiny of criminal sentences would be to federalize virtually every state case, allowing 
prisoners to routinely challenge their sentences by way of habeas corpus. 
'"' Andrew von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 65 MINN. L. REV. 
591, 597-600 (1981). 
"' /d. at 598. 
08 Martin Wasik, Desert arzd tlze Role of Previous Convictions, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 
233, 236 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992). 
09 ld. 
"' Vitiello, supra note 361, at 427-31. 
"'' While the penalties under California's Three Strikes are not retributivist, its second-
strike provisions do seem to reflect the view that punishment should be proportional to the 
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punishment only when an offender commits similar crimes. Helm 
received a true life sentence under South Dakota's law without regard to 
the nature of the felonies, as did Rummel.442 ln California, a third strike 
may be any felony,443 even a very minor one, as Andrade and related cases 
demonstrate.444 
Von Hirsch also argues that a repeat felon may be entitled to less 
mitigation as he commits additional crimes.445 The loss of mitigation 
theory creates problems for retributivists. It is unclear why a 
retributivist would not impose the fully deserved punishment for the 
first offense. But assuming that the retributivist gets past that argument, 
a second problem arises in the structure of many recidivist statutes. 
What about a felon who commits serious felonies early in her career, but 
who comes within the scope of a recidivist statute because of a minor 
felony, as may happen under Three Strikes?446 Should we say that such a 
person is entitled to no mitigation? ln one sense, her continued 
criminality suggests that she has not learned to conform her conduct to 
the requirements of the criminal law. But the criminal law and the 
earlier punishments may have worked partially. The offender may have 
abandoned serious or violent criminal conduct in favor of less serious 
criminal conduct.447 
Again, statutes like Three Strikes and many recidivist statutes do not 
reflect von Hirsch's loss of mitigation theory. Three Strikes doles out 
very long punishments without regard to the pattern of criminality. In 
fact, Three Strikes may work counter to von Hirsch's theory. An 
example developed by Professor Zimring demonstrates the point: a 
felon who commits a burglar/" a theft, and a burglary does not qualify 
for a Three Strikes sentence.44 In contrast, an offender who is convicted 
underlying conduct. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a)(l) (Deering 2003). Thus, a burglar who 
commits a second burglary and a robber who commits a second robbery both receive 
enhanced sentences, but they do not receive the same sentence. Instead, the sentence 
relates to the crime committed. That is not true of third-strike felons. CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 667(e)(2)(A) (Deering 2003). Professor Zimring and his coauthors have argued that Three 
Strikes lacks a coherent penal theory. ZIMRJNG ET AL., supra note 329, at 9. 
'" S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-7-8 (Michie 2003); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) 
(Vernon 2004); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281 (1983). 
"' CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667(e)(2)(A) (Deering 2003). 
'"' Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 746-67 (9th Cir. 2001) . 
....., Wasik, supra note 438, at 233, 236. 
,.. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 379-80 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
"' See Vitiello, supra note 361, at 448-50. 
"' See Frank E. Zimring, Populism, Democratic Government and the Decline of Expert 
Authority: Some Reflections on "Three Strikes" in California, 28 PAC. L.J. 243,248-51 (1996). 
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of the same crimes, but is convicted of the two burglaries and then the 
theft, may be sentenced under Three Strikes.449 Someone who abandons 
the more serious conduct of burglary for the lesser crime of theft does 
not seem to abandon all claim for mitigation. 
In Punishment and Democracy, Zimring and his coauthors have argued 
that Three Strikes punishes inversely to an offender's desert.450 The 
authors compare an offender's minimum sentence under Three Strikes 
with his presumptive sentence were he convicted of different felonies 
without the Three Strikes sentence.451 Thus, an offender would receive a 
presumptive middle term of six years in prison were he sentenced for 
rape; if rape were his third strike, his minimum term of imprisonment 
would be twenty-five years, or about four times greater than his sentence 
under the rape statute.452 By comparison, a person whose final felony 
was burglary would have his minimum sentence increased twenty-five 
times his presumptive sentence under the burglary statute.453 
Proponents of laws like Three Strikes must concede that the 
justification for long prison terms is not retribution.454 If Three Strikes 
sentences are justified, the explanation must be found elsewhere. 
Indeed, proponents advance utilitarian arguments. They suggest that 
recidivist statutes are "forwarding looking" laws that attempt to use the 
offender's past criminal record as a predictor of future criminal 
conduct.455 Grounded in the idea that a small number of all felons 
commit a disproportionately large percentage of all crime/56 recidivist 
laws promote selective incapacitation, which reduces crime by targetinJ 
those most likely to commit a disproportionate number of crimes. 
Further, Three Strikes laws are intended to deter others from committing 
4-t9 Id. 
"" See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 329, at 120-21. 
451 Id. at 120. 
•s2 Id. 
453 ld. 
"s.~ ld. at 9. 
' " Radin, supra note 393, a t 1167 n.83; Vitiello, supra note 361, a t 422-23. 
'"' See FRANKLIN F. ZIMRING & GORDON H AWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL 
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 14-15 (1995) (revie wing d eb ate surrounding 
incapacita tion); see also A NDREW VON HIRscH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND 
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 31 (1985) (arguing that prospective 
considerations are incomp atib le w ith theory o f desert); Jacqueline Cohen, Selective 
l11capacitntion: All Assessment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 253,253 (ma king same a rgument). 
"' See, e.g., james A. Arda iz, California's Three Strikes Law: History, Expectatio11s, 
Consequences, 32 McGEORGE L. REV. 1, I2-15 (2000); Bill Jones, Wily tile Three Strikes Law is 
Working in Califomia, II STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23,24 (1999). 
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0 458 
cnmes. 
Whether any particular prison sentences deter or reduce crime 
through incapacitation is an empirical proposition that can be tested. 
Hence, even if one accepts an entirely utilitarian justification for 
punishment, particular sentences are warranted only if they work as a 
factual matter.459 The next section explores that question. 
IV. THREE STRIKES AND THE DROP IN THE CRIME RATE 
A. Proponents' Arguments 
Three Strikes proponents argue that the law successfully targets high-
rate offenders who commit a disproportionate number of crimes.460 As 
observed by one Three Strikes proponent, the law identifies "through 
past behavior those who have demonstrated a clear disposition to 
engage in serious criminal acts and whose conduct has not been deterred 
by conventional concepts of punishment."461 Imposing long sentences on 
those offenders causes a sharp drop in crime rates because they are no 
longer on the streets committing crimes. 
There are serious questions about whether Three Strikes targets the 
right offenders.462 When crime seemed to decline after passage of Three 
Strikes, the law's supporters acknowledged that the effect of longer 
incapacitation could not explain the decline in the crime rates.463 Three 
Strikes sentences would not have had time to work. For example, Three 
Strikes might have increased an offender's sentence to a minimum of 
twenty-five years in prison, from a term of six years. A decline in the 
crime rate that occurs before the Three Strikes enhancement kicks in 
cannot be a result of Three Strikes sentences.464 The law's supporters 
"" ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 329, at 94-97 (d iscussing deterrence as penological 
justification through process of elimination). 
"' Empirical research can provide a powerful assessment of qualitative assertions 
limited by assumptions employed in research strategy and time constraints. For a more 
detailed discussion of limits, see ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 329, at 101. 
"" Ardaiz, supra note 457, at 3; Jones, supra note 457, at 24 . 
.. , Ardaiz, supra note 457, at 8. 
'" ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 329, at 68 (questioning effect of selective incapacitation); 
Linda 5. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Do Tlzree Strikes Laws Make Sense? Habitual Offender 
Statutes azrd Criminallncapacitation, 87 GEO. L.J. 103, 113-18 (1998). 
"' ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 329, at 91-94; Linda 5. Beres & Thomas Griffith, Did "Tirree 
Strikes" Cause the Recent Drop in California Crime? An Analysis of the California Attorney 
General's Report, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 106-08 (1998). 
"" Beres & Griffith, supra note 463, at 118-20. 
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shifted their explanation for the decline in the crime rate from 
incapacitation to deterrence.465 
In either case, Three Strikes supporters have touted the law as an 
unqualified success because of sharp declines in California's crime rate. 
For example, in 1999, Governor Gray Davis, a Three Strikes supporter, 
vetoed a bill that would have authorized a study of California's Three 
Strikes law.466 His veto message declared that "[a]n additional study is 
unlikely to produce much, if any useful information that is not already 
available."46 No doubt, he had in mind reports like the 1998 study 
prepared by then Attorney General Dan Lungren's office, attributing 
most, if not all, of the decline in crime to Three Strikes. The report 
claimed that "[s]ince the passage of 'Three Strikes' ... the violent crime 
rate in California has dropped 26.9% with a 30.8% drop in the six major 
crime categories."468 According to the report, that is California's "largest 
overall drop in crime in any four-year period in history with double digit 
drops in every major crime category between 1994 and 1997."469 
Other Three Strikes supporters have echoed the view that Three 
Strikes is the reason for decreased crime in California. Justice Ardaiz, 
who gave early counsel to Three Strikes prime mover Mike Reynolds, 
has argued that the dramatic decline in crime since 1993 is best explained 
by Three Strikes: "[w]here there are a number of explanations for a 
given result, the simplest explanation is usually correct. The Three 
Strikes Law is that explanation."470 Secretary of State Bill Jones, who 
sponsored the original Three Strikes bill in the Assembly, finds 
additional statistical support for Three Strikes' effectiveness by 
comparing California's declining crime rate with crime rates elsewhere 
in the country. He contends that California's 4.9% decline in 1994, 
compared to a nationwide decline of only 2%, and its 7% decline in the 
first half of 1995, compared to a 1% drop nationwide, are attributable to 
"" See, e.g., Jones, supra note 457, at 24. Other law enforcement officials cite deterrence 
as a reason for supporting Three Strikes law. For example, a study conducted by an FBI 
agent in Los Angeles found a majority of juvenile offenders in a survey said they would not 
commit a serious or violent felony if they knew "that they would receive 25 years to life in 
prison." Jon Matthews, Bellefit of the Tlzree Strikes Disputed, THE FRESNO BEE, Nov. 9, 1999, at 
All. 
... Governor Davis's Veto Message ofS.B. 873, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000). 
"" Id. 
"'" Off. of the Atty. Gen., Cal. Dept. of J. "Three Strikes and You're Out"- Its Impact 
on the California Criminal Justice System After Four Years (1998), avnilable at http://www. 
threestrikes.org/ cag98_pgthree.htrnl [hereinafter Attorney General's Report] . 
4(,q Jd. 
"" Jones, supra note 457, at 24. 
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Three Strikes.471 
B. Studies Critical of Three Strikes' Success 
Three Strikes' opponents have pointed to reasons, in theory, why they 
doubt that Three Strikes would cause all or most of the decline in the 
crime rate.472 Even if the picture portrayed by the law's supporters were 
correct, social scientists might demand stronger evidence of a causal link 
between the passage of Three Strikes and the decline in crime.473 Shortly 
after Lungren's office published its report, two scholars demonstrated 
that not only might the data be explained by other causes, but also that 
the report had the data wrong.474 For example, the Attorney General's 
report compared crime data for 1990-1993 with that of 1994-1997 (the 
three years preceding and following the passage of Three Strikes) and 
concluded that the overall crime rate475 dropped by only 2.4% in the pre-
Three Strikes years and by 30.8% immediately after its passage.476 
Viewed in that light, "the dramatic change" did take place right after 
passage of Three Strikes. But aggregating the data for 1990-1993 creates 
a misleading picture. As argued by Professors Beres and Griffith, "[t]he 
violent crime rate rose sharply in 1989 and 1990 and rose by lesser 
amounts in 1991 and 1992. The pattern reversed in 1993, one year before 
Three Strikes, when the violent crime rate declined by 4.1% .... The 
AGR [Attorney General's report] conceals the fact that the violent crime 
rate began to fall the year before Three Strikes was adopted by lumping 
the year 1993 with the years 1990-1992 when the violent crime rate 
rose."
477 
The authors examined other data relied on by the Attorney General's 
report and cast doubt on its conclusions. For example, they examined 
·1!1 ld. 
m Beres & Griffith, supra note 462; Vitiello, supra note 361. 
"' ZIMRLNG ET AL., supra note 329, at 33-35, 88. 
'" Beres & Griffith, supra note 463, at 106-07; DARYL A. HELLMAN & NEIL 0 . ALPER, 
ECONOMICS OF CRIME (4th ed. 1997) (noting that differences in crime rates may be due to 
changes in number of agencies reporting such crimes or willingness of victims to report 
offenses to police). 
"' Beres & Griffith, supra note 463, at 104-06. Beres explains the different indices 
available for measuring crime activity. The index most commonly used is the FBI Crime 
Index. However, official statistics on crime in California were measured using the 
California Crime Index, which omits property crimes of arson and larceny theft. 
'" Attorney General's Report, supra note 468, at 3. 
'" Beres & Griffith, supra note 463, at 109; Attorney General's Report, supra note 468, at 
13. 
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the crime data for felony theft.478 Theft does not qualify as a first or 
second strike; but, as is readily apparent from a review of cases like 
Andrade, it may qualify as a third strike. If Three Strikes deterred crime, 
the post-enactment decline in theft should have been most dramatic 
among older felons with two strikes.479 But the data showed a steeper 
decline among young felons than among older ones.480 
Beres and Griffith also considered the Attorney General's report's 
assertion that California's crime rates had declined more dramatically 
than did the crime rates in other states.481 Again, the Attorney General's 
use of data was misleading. During the mid-1990s, "the drop in violent 
crime . .. was greatest among urban minority youth.".a2 That pattern was 
typical throughout the nation.483 Hence, states with significant numbers 
of minority youth living in large cities experienced the largest declines in 
their crime rates.48-l California's Three Strikes law cannot be the reason 
for declines in crime rates in New York and Massachusetts, where the 
decline in crime was not attributable to laws like California's Three 
Strikes.485 
Other statistical studies have cast doubt on the claims of Three Strikes 
proponents. For example, Mike Males and Dan Macallair examined data 
from two different ~erspectives .486 First, they examined the impact on 
African Americans.4 Second, they compared crime data from different 
counties in the state.488 
The authors examined declining crime rates among African 
Americans. They hypothesized that the greatest decline in crime should 
occur among men in the age group between thirty and forty years old.489 
This age group would be the most likely to have accumulated two 
m Beres & Griffith, supra note 463, at 107. 
"" ld. at 120-22. 
'
80 ld. at 121-22, 124-25. 
"' !d. at 127-30. 
•s2 Id. at 127. 
483 Id. 
'"' !d. at 127-30. 
"' Beres and Griffith explain that Boston experienced a crime drop through methods 
other than implementing similar three-strike laws. For example, the city aggressively 
targeted violent gang leaders for prosecution, patrolled gang hang-outs and vacant lots, 
and also worked with community leaders. The approach was copied nationwide. !d. 
... Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: Tire Failure of California's "Tirree Strikes 
and You're Out" Lilw, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 65,67 (2000). 
487 ld. at 67. 
488 ld. at 67-68. 
"" !d. at 66-67. 
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strikes.490 If the law deters, men in that age group should be the most 
susceptible to its deterrent effect. But the most dramatic reduction in 
crime was among those under twenty years old, not among those 
between thirty and forty years old.491 The authors also noted that adult 
crime rates were declining before Three Strikes became law, again 
suggesting that much of the decline was not caused by the law.492 
The authors' second significant finding was that counties where the 
law was most vigorously enforced did not necessarily experience the 
sharpest decline in the crime rate.493 For example, Sacramento and Los 
Angeles counties applied the law approximately seven times more 
frequently than did Alameda and San Francisco counties. The level of 
enforcement did not correlate with the decline in crime in those counties. 
While Sacramento County's homicide rate declined 23% and violent 
crime declined 10%, San Francisco experienced declines of 35% and 33% 
. h . 494 
m t ose categones. 
Frank Zimring, Gordon Hawkins, and Sam Kamin have conducted the 
most ambitious study to date.495 Their results were first published in a 
monograph in 1999496 and in a longer book in 2001.497 Their findings are 
consistent with other empirical studies that suggest that Three Strikes 
simply does not account for a significant part of the decline in 
California's crime rate. 
Their study attempted to answer a number of questions. They asked 
how much crime one- and two-strike offenders commit.498 They also 
asked whether Three Strikes' penalties are being enforced and what 
possible deterrent effect the law may have had.499 Rather than relying on 
... Id. at 67 . 
.. , I d. 
,., Id. 
,., Id. at 67-68. 
••• Id. See also David Schultz, No Joy in Mudville Tonight, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
557 (2000) (offering a lternative explanations for mid to late 1990's crime ra te drop). 
"" ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 329. 
496 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON H AWKINS & SAM KAMIN, CRIME AND PuNISHMENT IN 
CALIFORNIA: THE IMPACT OF THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT (1999); ZIMRING ET AL., supra 
note 329, at vi. 
,., ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 329. 
'" The authors asked the question because, if those offenders committed as much crime 
as Three Strikes proponents co ntend, then incarcerating those offenders should make a 
large difference in the decline of crime rates. If that were the case, incapacitation should 
yield significant benefits . By contrast, if those offenders are not resp onsible fo r a large 
percentage of crime committed, their incarceration cannot exp lain the large drop in the 
crime ra te . ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 329, at 33-35. 
"
9 Michael Vitiello, Book Review: Prtnisllment and Democracy: A Hard Look at Three 
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aggregate crime data, the authors examined arrest records of no-, one-
and two-strike felons to see who was committing what kinds of crimes.500 
They also sought data from three different cities with distinct reputations 
for their enforcement of Three Strikes.501 
Several of the authors' findings contradict the claim that Three Strikes 
caused the decline in California's crime rates. For example, the amount 
of crime actually committed by those targeted by Three Strikes is quite 
small, slightly over 10.5% for one- and two-strike defendants, only 3.3% 
for two-strike offenders.502 As a result, incarcerating both classes of 
Three Strikes offenders does not account for a large amount of crime 
committed by other offenders who do not fall within the provisions of 
the law. Also contrary to claims of the law's proponents, Three Strikes 
offenders did not account for their proportionate share of violent 
offenses.503 Incarcerating Three Strikes offenders simply cannot explain 
the significant drop in the crime rate. 
Similar to the Beres-Griffith study, Zimring and his coauthors found 
that the Attorney General's report's claims did not withstand close 
scrutiny.504 Unlike the report's assertions, California did not experience a 
sharp decline in crime rates upon the enactment of Three Strikes. The 
downward trend started before Three Strikes was enacted, and the slope 
of the downward trend did not change when the law took effect.505 The 
downward trend in California also paralleled the downward trend 
elsewhere in the United States.506 
The coauthors recognized that the pre-Three Strikes downward trend 
might have stopped but for Three Strikes.507 To determine whether that 
was the case, they explored additional data.508 They concluded that 
incapacitation did not explain the downward trend for the reasons 
Strikes' Overblown Promises, 90 CAL. L. REV. 257, 272 (2002) (reviewing FRANKLIN E. 
ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKJNS, & SAM KAMIN, P UNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE 
STRIKES AND YOU'RE O UT lN CALIFORNIA (2001 )}. 
500 Me thodology involved collecting arrest data for a large number of offenders both 
befo re and after p assage of Three Strikes from three California cities: San Diego, Los 
Angeles and San Francisco. !d. 
'101 /d. 
"" ZIMRING ET AL., s11pra note 329, at 59. 
50
' ld. a t 43-46, 59 (expla ining that in 1993, third-s trike fe lons, gro up most obviously 
targeted by Three Strikes, committed only one felony in 30). 
"" ld. at 31-35. 
"" ld. at 88. 
... ld. at 88-89 . 
,., ld. 
""' ld. a t 91-94. 
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discussed above:509 offenders sentenced shortly after Three Strikes 
would have been in prison anyway.510 Three Strikes also did not result in 
a significant increase in the prison population, which might otherwise 
explain the continued drop in the crime rates.5n 
The authors also considered whether Three Strikes might have led to 
significant decreases in the crime rate through its deterrent effect.512 
They made a number of assumptions in analyzing relevant data. For 
example, they assumed that non-Three Strikes offenders would not be 
deterred at the same rate as would offenders facing second- and third-
strike sentences.513 The authors collected pre- and post-Three Strikes 
data for the three groups, those not facing sentencing under Three 
Strikes, those facing sentencing under the law's two-strikes provisions, 
and those facing third-strike sentences.514 The percentage of the total 
amount of crime committed by each group remained constant.515 Surely, 
if Three Strikes were a major deterrent, the steepest declines in crime 
rates should have been among those facing third-strike sentences of a 
minimum of twenty-five years to life. That simply was not the case. 
Using additional analytical measurement, the authors left open the 
possibility that, at most, their data support a finding of a "trace" amount 
of general deterrence, far less than the amounts claimed by the law's 
516 proponents. 
"" Beres & Griffith, supra note 463, at 119-20. 
"' ZIMRJNG ET AL., supra note 329, at 91. 
"' Id. at 102. Zimring and his coauthors argue that we should recognize that society 
will receive "some further marginal incapacitation" in future years when Three Strikes 
offenders remain in prison past the dates when they would otherwise have been released. 
However, they also suggest that the kind of benefits promised by Three Strikes proponents 
will not occur because the law has not resulted in incarceration of repeat offenders whom 
the law purported to target. 
"' I d. at 94-95. 
'" ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 329, at 95-96; Vitiello, supra note 499, at 277. 
'" ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 329, at 95-101. 
~15 Id . at 100. 
"' ld. at 105. The authors first published the results of their studies in 1999, before they 
expanded the study into a book. ld. at vi. Two political scientists challenged the 1999 
study's methodology. See generally Brian P. Janiskee & Edward J. Erler, Crime, Punishment, 
and Romero: An Analysis of the Case Against California's Three Strikes Law, 39 D UQ. L. REV. 43 
(2000). I have described their criticisms elsewhere and discussed Zimring and Kamin's 
response as well. Vitiello, supra note 499, at 275-77. I recommend Zimring's published 
response to the criticism of his coauthored study. See generally Michael Vitiello, Rebuttal 
Somewhat Frantic: A Brief Response to Crime, Punishment, and Romero, 40 D UQ. L. REV. 615 
(2002). Two of Janiskee and Erler's criticisms are relevant here. First is that the study done 
by Zimring and his colleagues was methodologically flawed because of s tatistical 
conflation of arrest and crimes. That is, they contended that the study's authors were 
wrong to assume that the three groups of offenders faced the same chance of arrest. 
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C. Shepherd's Economic Model 
More recently, economist Joanna M. Shepherd has argued that Three 
Strikes has, in fact, deterred a significant amount of crime.517 Her central 
thesis was that prior research, including the study by Zimring, Hawkins, 
and Kamin, ignored the full deterrent effect of the law by focusing only 
on the third strike.518 She argued that because repeat offenders commit 
only 10% of the crime, focusing on the last strike ignores 90% of all 
crime.519 Based on her econometric models, she concluded that criminals 
actively avoid an offense that would qualify as a first strike.520 As a 
result, Three Strikes has deterred far more crime than prior studies 
indicate.521 
Shepherd expanded on traditional economic analysis of crime. In her 
attempt to account for the deterrent effect of Three Strikes, she used a 
new approach, not employed by other scholars who do economic 
modeling of crime.522 Borrowed from economic models relating to 
financial investments, "options and investment under uncertainty"523 
refers to the idea that "an 'option' value [exists] to delay an investment 
decision in order to wait the arrival of new information about market 
conditions. "524 
Second, they contended that the study attempted to measure the law's deterrent effect too 
early after the law was passed. In response to the first criticism, Zimring and Kamin argue 
that, were their critics correct that one-and two-strike felons are more likely to have been 
caught than no-strike felons, the effect would be that it "would further decrease the share 
of crime that these special target groups commit and thus the potential crime saving of a 
Three Strikes program." Source on file with the author. Thus, if those eligible for 25-year-
to-life sentences were twice as likely to have been caught as no-strike felons, then their 
share would have been only half of the total of 3.3% of the crimes that Zimring and his 
coauthors found to have been committed by that group of offenders. 
In response to the criticism that the study measured deterrence too close to the 
effective date of the law, Zimring and Kamin stated, "If Uaniskee and Erler] had read into 
the literature on deterrence they would have found that since publicity and concern are 
maximum around the time of legal change, the closer the observation to the change, the 
greater the chance for finding a shift in general effect, that is the deterrent effect of the 
threat." Source on file with the author. 
"' Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of Califomia's 
Two-and Three Strikes Legislation, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 159 (2002). 
5111 Jd. at 161. 
... Id. at 171. 
"" Id. at 200. 
'" /d. at 201. 
"' ld. at 171 n.51. 
'" !d. 
'" Alan Carruth, Andy Dickerson & Andrew Henley, Wlmt Do We Know About 
hzvestment Under Uncertainty?, 14(2) J. ECON. SURVEYS 119 (2000). See also AVlNASH K. DIXIT 
& ROBERT 5. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 144-45 (1994); RobertS. Chirinko, 
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In reliance on the investment analogy, Shepherd's model assumes that 
individuals choose to allocate their time between legitimate and 
illegitimate opportunities based on the expected utility from each 
activity.525 An offender avoids committing a crime if delayed 
punishment (lengthy sentences for second and third strikes) outweighs 
actual and psychic income derived from committing the crime.526 Once 
the offender has spent his first "strikable" offense, he no longer has that 
option to spend for future offenses; he is one step closer to receivin§ 
augmented punishment from his second and third strike, if convicted.5 
Without the first strike to spend for future offenses, the cost of 
punishment increases dramatically with the second and third strike, and 
the cost of crime becomes unacceptably high for the offender.528 Reliance 
on the investment analogy is especially important because, without the 
assumption that a no-strike offender is weighing the option of waiting to 
commit his first strike, the general economic model of crime would 
predict a deterrent effect for one- and two-strike offenders only.529 With 
Shepherd's assumption in place, Three Strikes is deterring or changing 
the behaviol30 of the vast majority of first-time offenders.531 
Perhaps anticipating criticism of the assumption that no-strike 
offenders avoid certain crimes because they do not want to use up their 
first strike, Shepherd contended that her assumption is based on simple 
intuition. She analogized no-strike offenders to batters in baseball. 
According to her, "[a] baseball player who can make only three strikes 
chooses which pitches to swing at much more cautiously than a player 
who can make unlimited strikes."532 
Investment Under Uncertainty: A Review Essay, 20 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1801, 1803 
(1996). 
'"' Shepherd, supra note 517, at 171-72. 
526 ld. at 171. 
527 /d. at 172. 
Sllf Jd. at 173. 
'"' That is so because the law increases punishment only for those offenders; hence, 
only for those offenders is there a decreased utility. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRJME AND 
PUNISHMENT 1 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds., Columbia Press 1974). In his 
seminal work on the economic model of crime, Becker theorizes that the optimal number of 
offenses to be committed is directly proportional to the probability of conviction and the 
severity of the punishment of the criminal actor. Thus, an increase in punishment will 
correspondingly decrease the number of offenses that are committed. ld. at 9-11. 
,. Shepherd, supra note 517, at 196 (hypothesizing that some criminals may substitute 
nonstrikable offenses such as larceny and auto theft for strikable offenses such as murder 
and robbery because of perceived risk of enhanced penalty). 
S)l Jd. 
"' ld. at 174, n.54. 
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Shepherd used county-specific data from 1983-1996.533 Her article 
concludes that Three Strikes has had a significant deterrent effect. She 
found a strong negative coefficient in murder, aggravated assault, 
robbery and burglary.534 For offenses that are not first strikes, such as 
larceny and auto theft, she found a positive relationship that suggested 
that Three Strikes did not deter these crimes.535 Her explanation is that 
first-time offenders are shifting their activities to felony activity that does 
not constitute a first strike.536 
Shepherd's study is open to a number of criticisms. An established 
literature challenges the general methodology that she uses.537 For 
example, critics attack a basic assumption of economic analysis, that a 
criminal actor making a choice between legitimate and illegal activity or 
between different kinds of crimes has perfect information about the cost 
and utility of those choices.538 That assumption is doubtful. 
Critics of the economic model argue that instead of making rational, 
fully informed choices, people make choices based on their own 
reference levels.539 Criminals in particular act on less than perfect 
information. Thus, many criminals discount their future and think and 
act primarily in terms of their present desires and needs.540 Some 
533 ld. at 182. 
" ' ld. at 189-90. 
\.15 Jd. 
"" ld. at 190-93. 
"' See, e.g., William L. Barnes, Jr., Note, Revenge on Utilitarianism: Renouncil1g a 
Comprel1ensive Economic Theory of Crime and P1mishment, 74 IND. L.J . 627 (1999) (discussing 
origins of economic model of criminal choice espoused by Gary Becker); Samuel 
Issacharoff, Can There be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1729 (1998); 
Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1653 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051 (2000) (discussing 
problems with applying economics to Jaw); Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral 
Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1747-48 (1998) (arguing application of economic 
theory to law has promising future but is currently subject to many serious and jus tifiable 
criticisms, and that "[t]he skeptics are right to be critical and skeptical, and we should be 
too."). 
'"' Barnes, supra note 537, at 630 (discussing assumption that criminals make choices 
with perfect information). 
"" Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 13 (1998) 
(discussing several shortcomings of economic model and suggesting methods to improve 
model by utilizing established concepts from field of psychology). By "reference level," 
Rabin means that people often perceive a new s ituation relative to their own current 
situation rather than to some absolute. ld. 
,.. See generally Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Habitual Offender Statutes and 
Criminal Deterrence, 34 CONN. L. REV. 55, 63 (2001). The commentators discuss a criminal's 
discounting of the prison term: 
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criminals commit the "gambler's fallacy."541 That is, like the uninformed 
gambler, at least some criminals believe that the fact that they have been 
caught in the past reduces the chances that they will be caught in the 
future.542 Apart from a host of problems relating to whether we 
generally act consistently with the kind of rationality assumed by 
economists,543 violent criminals are the least likely to act consis tently with 
rational planning. By definition, crimes like second-degree murder and 
other forms of unintentional homicide do not require any planning 
activity.544 Voluntary manslaughter typically occurs on the spur of the 
Offenders are likely to discount prison time to be served in the future so that a 
year in prison to be served five years from now will be viewed as less of a 
punishment than a year to be served immediately. Thus doubling the sentence 
length for an offense does not double the perceived severity of the sentence. 
Discounting future pleasures and pains is not confined to potential offenders. 
Many people value immediate pleasure more than future pleasure, as illustrated 
by the nation's record levels of consumer debt. Moreover, even if an individual 
values present and future pleasure equally, he may discount prison time to be 
served in the future because of a belief that he may die before actually serving 
the time or that he might be released early because of a change in government 
policy. 
'" The gambler's fallacy refers to the idea that, in some instances, individuals reduce 
their estimate of the likelihood of a purely chance event. For example, "card players 
sometimes increase their bets after losing several consecutive hands because they feel they 
are due to win." ld. at 63. In addition, sometimes, "(l]ottery participants decrease the 
amount wagered on a particular combination of numbers after that sequence has 'hit."' ld. 
In reality, losing several hands or a winning combination of numbers is entirely 
independent of a subsequent hand or combination of numbers. ld.; Greg Pogarsky & Alex 
R. Piquero, Can Punishment Encourage Offending? Investigating the "Resetting" Effect, 40 J. 
RES. CRJME & DELINQ. 95, 99-100 {2003) . 
..., Id. at 112-15 {providing preliminary conclusion that some offenders invoke 
gambler's fallacy which could explain why, contrary to theory of specific deterrence, some 
punishment has "positive punishment effect"). 
'" The economic model of criminal choice fails to account for certain well-documented 
decision-making biases. Human beings suffer from many systematic decision-making 
quirks that deviate from the rational choice model. For example, people will generally 
favor a "fair" decision even if that decision does not maximize their individual utility. See 
Ulen, supra note 537. People also systematically interpret information most favorably to 
their self-interests and are overly optimistic about bad things happening to them. See Jolls, 
supra note 537. Decisional biases that affect all people illustrate that in certain 
circumstances people are not maximizing utility and that deviations are not "random" as 
assumed by law and economics. See Issacharoff, supra note 537. 
"' See Ceaser v. Ault, 169 F. Supp. 2d 981, 998 (N.D. Iowa 2001). Chief Judge Bennett 
discussed the relevance of the criminal actor in Ceaser. He stated "[t]he legislature could 
conclude that (property crimes] are based on calculating self-interest, while crimes against 
persons are crimes of 'hate and passion' and that, as a result, crimes of passion are not 
susceptible to deterrence." See also Barnes, supra note 537 at 640-41 (discussing how some 
1092 University of California, Davis [Vol. 37:1025 
moment when the victim provokes the defendant.545 Further, violent 
criminals are often intoxicated, reducing their planning activity.546 The 
kinds of crimes most susceptible to rational planning, like securities 
fraud or property offenses, are not the crimes that create the greatest 
bli 547 pu c concern. 
One recent study attempted to test the economic model's fundamental 
assumption of the economic model, that offenders are rational and 
informed.548 Economist David Anderson based his conclusions on 
interviews of 278 male inmates. Among his questions were, "When you 
committed this crime, how likely did you think it was that you would be 
caught?" and "When you committed the crime, did you know what the 
likely punishment would be if you were caught?"549 Anderson's data 
show that "76 percent of active criminals and 89 percent of the most 
violent criminals either perceive no risk of apprehension or are 
incognizant of the likely punishment for their crimes."550 The study 
certainly supports the general criticism of the economic model of 
• 551 
cnme. 
criminal choices are irrational choices by definition). 
,., DRESSLER, supra note 391, at 528-32. 
,.. A 1997 national survey found that 42% of those convicted of violent crimes were 
under the influence of alcohol at the time of their offense. U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU 
OF STATISTICS, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND TREATMENT, STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 1997, 3 
(1999). 
,., Barnes, supra note 537, at n.151. citing Thomas Bak, Does tl1e Offense Charged Predict 
the Type and FrequenCIJ of Pretrial Violations?, 24 NEW ENG.]. ON CRJM & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
65, 75 (1998) ("societal notions that crimes against property are less heinous than crimes 
against persons"). 
"" David A. Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis ar1d Picking Pockets at the Pickpocket's 
Hanging, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 295, 300-02 (2002). 
,.. Id. at 300, 309. Regarding the former question, the answer choices available to 
participants were: (a) very likely; (b) somewhat likely; {c) possible, but not likely; (d) I did 
not think I would be caught; and (e) I did not think about it. The latter question had the 
following answer choices: (a) I knew exactly what the punishment would be; (b) I had a 
good idea; (c) I had some idea; (d) I had no idea, or I thought I knew but I was wrong; and 
(e) I didn't think about it. ld. at 309. 
'!<I Id. at 295. Seventy-six percent of all participants selected either (d) or (e) in either, or 
both of, the questions in the preceding footnote. When the pool was constrained to 
"deadly" criminals, the total increased to 89%. Thus, Anderson concluded that these 
criminal actors were either uninformed or irrational. Id. at 304-05. Moreover, and 
particularly striking, even among criminals with accurate information and the ability to 
make rational choices, around 70% reported that no punishment would have prevented 
them from participating in criminal activity. !d. at 305. 
'" Some limitations of Anderson's findings should be noted. First, all participants in 
the survey were apprehended so the results may be biased towards criminal actors that are 
more likely to be apprehended. Anderson argues that this bias in fact makes the results 
conservative. ld. at 301. Second, in general, survey data is subject to the honesty of the 
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Apart from the general criticism of her methodology, Shepherd's work 
is open to specific criticisms. One problem with a model like Shepherd's 
is that it makes a number of assumptions that are then used to explain 
perceived results. One of Shepherd's key assumptions is based on her 
analogy of no-strike felons to potential investors. That is, if no-strike 
felons are like potential investors, they make a cost-benefit analysis of 
their crimes based on whether the criminal activity in which they hope to 
engage will count as a fi rst or second strike.552 This "net option value of 
waiting to commit the first strike" is a variable that she includes in her 
mathematical calculation. As discussed above, she offers little support 
for her intuition, other than her analogy to the baseball player's view of 
his first strike.553 The assumption is critical because traditional economic 
analysis would have predicted a deterrent effect only for one- and two-
strike felons, not no-strike felons.554 
As discussed above, Shepherd made assumptions about how criminals 
act, inserted data into her economic model, then drew conclusions from 
the numeric results that her model produced.555 She found a significant 
negative coefficient, indicating that deterrence took place between Three 
participants. /d. Third, the sample size was fairly small, with only 278 participants. Id. at 
300. A larger sample size could provide more reliable data. 
'" Shepherd, supra note 517, at 172. 
'" Id. at 174 n.54. 
' " See supra note 529. Even Shepherd's baseball analogy does not support her 
intuition. Baseball fans are aware that hitters' averages vary dramatically depending on 
the count. Fans are aware that on "pitchers' counts," like 0-2 or 1-2, batters' composite 
averages are much lower than they are on "hitters' counts," like 2-0 or 3-1. JIM ALBERT & 
JAY BENNETI, CURVE BALL: BASEBALL, STATISTICS, AND THE ROLE OF CHANCE IN THE GAME 
87 (2001). Most batters have a much higher average on their first s trike than they do on 
their third. Id. at 102 (finding that "players generally hit 158 points lower when the count is 
at two strikes ... instead of being ahead in the count"). Only certain types of hitters have 
high averages when they have two strikes. ld. at 104-06 (citing as example Tony Gwynn, 
hitter with outstanding bat control and short stroke, who performs better in two-strike 
situation than Jim Thome, power hitter with long batting stroke). Thus, data show that 
strikes are not fungible, contrary to the assumption that is central to Shepherd's thesis. 
Shepherd, supra note 517, at 174 n .54. 
Further, baseball players have a reasonably good understanding of the strike zone, 
even if they complain that the strike zone varies among umpires. Leonard Koppett, The 
Thinking Fan: Troubles With Strike Zone Question of Size, Eyes, SEA TILE POST-INTELL!GENCER, 
June 13, 2003, at C8 (arguing that sheer number of major league baseball umpires today, 71 
total, leads to inconsistent strike zone). In addition, unlike criminals, batters do not 
discount the possibility that the rules will not apply to them during the game. Thus, as 
discussed in the Article above, criminals are unlike baseball players because they are often 
unaware of the applicable rules of law and discount the possibility that they will be caught. 
Supra notes 538-43. 
'" Shepherd, supra note 517, at 185-93. 
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Strikes legislation and the commission of particular crimes.556 Murder, 
aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary had negative coefficients, 
whereas larceny and auto theft had positive coefficients.557 Shepherd 
concluded, therefore, that the law was deterring offenses that counted as 
strikes, but not those offenses that did not count as strikes: "Fearing 
initial strikes, rs:otential criminals commit fewer crimes that qualify as 
initial strikes." 58 Her observation concerning the decline in the murder 
rate should have raised questions: murder carries the possibility for the 
death penalty.559 Shepherd fails to explain how one might not be 
deterred by the prospect of the death penalty, but suddenly decide not to 
commit murder because it would be a first strike. She may have an 
answer to that conundrum, but I fail to see one.560 The decline in murder 
rates should have prompted a different question: what factors, other than 
Three Strikes, might explain the decline in crime? 
Shepherd's article provides a good example of the general problem of 
overestimating the rationality of criminal offenders. She assumed that 
they possess an extraordinary amount of rationality and legal knowledge 
when she discussed their selection of criminal activities. That is, they 
choose to avoid felonies that constitute strikes and rationally choose 
nonstrikable offenses.56' She cited no evidence to support the view that 
offenders know which offenses are within the list of felonies that 
constitute first and second strikes.562 The list is quite comprehensive,563 
not one that felons are likely to have digested. Even some court 
decisions suggest that the technical requirements of Three Strikes are not 
easily understood.564 Shepherd assumed a far greater familiarity with 
'"' ld. at 189-90. 
SS7 Id. 
'
58 ld. at 190. 
'" CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 189, 190.3 (Deering 2004). 
"" Shepherd merely points out that the murder coefficient was relatively small 
supporting her theory that stricter sentencing may not lead to a substantial decrease in 
murders as compared with other crimes. Shepherd, supra note 517, at 190. 
"'' Id . at 171-81 (discussing author's model of delayed punishment). 
"'' /d. at 171-77 (discussing model of delayed punishment and model specification). No 
doubt, offenders are more informed than the public at large on matters of sentencing and 
prosecutors' practices. Beres & Griffith, supra note 540, at 61 (stating "(n]ot surprisingly, 
offenders generally are better informed about criminal sanctions than the average citizen"). 
It does not follow, however, that offenders have the kind of sophisticated familiarity with 
the complexities of Three Strikes. 
563 CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 667.5(c), 1192.7(c) (Deering 2004) (e.g. , murder, mayhem, rape, 
forced oral copulation, forced sodomy). 
"" E.g. , Vitiello, supra note 362, at 1692-94. Another example of such technicality is 
section 667(c)(5), which seemingly allows a 20% reduction for good behavior credits to a 
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technical niceties than is likely. 
Elsewhere in her article, she did not assume a similar sophistication 
when, to do so, would undercut her deterrence theory. Specifically, she 
examined data on a county-by-county basis, rather than on a statewide 
basis. She examined whether strict enforcement in one county merely 
led offenders to migrate, i.e., to commit crimes in neighboring counties. 
She concluded that strict enforcement in one county actually leads to a 
decrease in crime in neighboring counties.565 She hypothesized that: 
In large cities, news reports or publicity about stricter sentencing 
practices may not specify exactly which county is imposing the 
stricter sentence. In addition, criminals may not be sure where the 
actual county lines are located. Furthermore, criminals may not be 
aware of exactly how the criminal justice system chooses the 
jurisdiction in which to prosecute the criminal: is the appropriate 
jurisdiction the one in which the crime took place, where the 
criminal lives, or where the criminal was apprehended?566 
I am inclined to agree with Shepherd that criminals are not likely to have 
clear answers (or perhaps even think about) these questions. But her 
assumption that first-time offenders know which felonies are first strikes 
suggests that she is willing to change her view of how sophisticated 
criminals are, depending on whether her assumption is necessary to 
support her thesis. In addition, while she suggested that counties that 
strictly enforce Three Strikes experienced the deepest decline in crime 
rates, she did not cite specific underlying data concerning county-by-
county enforcement.567 Nor did she rebut findings in other studies that 
suggest no correlation (or an inverse correlation) between levels of 
enforcement in different counties and declining crime rates.568 
life sentence with a minimum of 25 years. However, the section must be viewed in 
conjunction with Article 2.5 of the Penal Code (beginning at section 2930), which applies 
only to determinate sentences. A sentence must therefore contain a determinate 
component to be eligible for good behavior credits reduction. A determinate sentence is 
not the legal equivalent of a minimum sentence: a determinate sentence has a lower and an 
upper limit while a minimum sentence has only a lower limit. Because life imprisonment 
with a minimum term of 25 years lacks a determinate component, California Penal Code 
§ 667(c)(5) good behavior credits are not applicable. /11 re Cervera, 16 P.3d 176, 178-80 (Cal. 
2001). 
,.. Shepherd, supra note 517, at 197. 
"" /d. at 199-200. 
567 ld. at 182. 
,.. /d. at 164 (stating, "[t]here seem to be little if any relationship between a county's 
population, crime rates, and the two-and Three Strikes implementation"). 
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Zimring and his coauthors looked at crime records of specific 
offenders, those who had yet to commit a strike-felony, those who now 
qualified for a second-strike sentence, and those facing third-strike 
sentences.569 As discussed above, the first- and second-strike offenders 
continued to commit their share of crimes, suggesting that they were not 
in fact deterred.570 The authors also considered the possibility that all 
three groups were deterred in the same proportion and rejected that 
assumption as irrational.571 Shepherd's study turns on that 
• 572 
assumption. 
The study by Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin remains the most detailed 
and authoritative study to date. It suggests that California may get some 
increased reduction in crime based on the incapacitation of offenders, 
after the enhanced sentence kicks in.573 They recognize that the data may 
indicate a minor deterrent effect.574 
D. The Utilitarian Perspective 
Even if Three Strikes has some measurable deterrent effect and may 
reduce crime through incapacitation in the future, Three Strikes 
sentences may nonetheless be unjustified from a utilitarian perspective. 
As discussed above, utilitarianism claims punishment is morally justified 
if the social benefit (lowered crime rates) outweighs the pain caused 
(imprisonment of an offender).575 A full assessment of that utilitarian 
calculation must focus on alternatives to imprisonment as wel1.576 Thus, 
even if Three Strikes does deter, and may reduce crime through 
incapacitation, its long sentences are immoral in utilitarian terms if a less 
painful alternative is available.5n 
When Three Strikes proponents address alternatives at all, they tend to 
dismiss alternatives without serious attention to which alterna tives work 
"" ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 329, at 41-60. 
"" See discussion supra notes 514-16. 
571 ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 329, at 94-101. 
>n Shepherd, supra note 517, at 190-91. 
"' ZIMR!NG ET AL., supra note 329, at 101-05. 
514 ld. 
"" See supra notes 455-58 and accompanying text. 
'" Vitiello, supra note 361, at 432-41 (discussing flaws in estimates of impact of Three 
Strikes in reducing crime in California while pointing out failure of law's proponents to 
address such issues as high costs of building more prisons and expense of incarceration of 
aging prisoners) . 
577 ld. 
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and which do not work.578 In contrast, discussion of the true cost of 
Three Strikes must focus on a number of considerations. 
First, while Three Strikes has had a less dramatic effect on the court 
system than some critics predicted,579 its effect on the prison system is 
real and will increase significantly over time.580 Continued incarceration 
of aging Three Strikes felons is hard to justify in light of the typical 
criminal profile. Most older offenders represent a limited risk; violent 
crime remains a young man's game.581 Insofar as California is making a 
choice between dedicating resources to capturing and incarcerating 
young, violent offenders, and warehousing older felons, even those who 
have no history of violent crime,582 Three Strikes compels a bad choice. 
Second, some critics of the current Three Strikes law emphasize that 
the law does not focus on truly violent felons.583 Data demonstrate that 
this concern is warranted. Many offenders now incarcerated under 
Three Strikes committed relatively minor felonies as their third strikes.584 
Not only is that consistent with the view that aging felons are graduating 
out of violent crime, it also suggests that Three Strikes, as written, casts a 
net so wide that it will include many offenders who are not particularly 
violent.585 A utilitarian cannot justify spending many thousands of 
dollars to keep a petty criminal in prison when doing so costs rna~ 
thousands of dollars more than the cost of the offender's crimes. 
Insofar as the law deters, similar deterrence might be achieved by a more 
carefully targeted recidivist statute, one that would lead to longer 
sentences only for the most dangerous felons.587 Studies suggest that 
alternatives to the current Three Strikes law would produce similar 
578 E.g., Alt'Y GEN. REP., supra note 468, at 11-13. 
'"' ZIMRlNG ET AL., suprn note 329, a t 126. 
580 /d. 
'" U.S. v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1199 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., concurring). Posner 
argued that crime is a young man's game: "We know that criminal careers taper off with 
age, although w ith the aging of the population and the improvements in the health of the 
aged the fract ion of crimes committed by the elderly is rising. Crimes that involve a risk of 
p hysical injury to the criminal are especia lly a young man 's game." See also ]AMES Q. 
WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 126-41 (1985). 
582 Vitiello, suprn note 361, at 437-41. 
,._, Lou Cannon , A Dark Side to 3-Strike Laws, WASH. POST, June 20, 1994, at A-15 
(quoting Marc Klaas, Polly's father, when he withdrew his support for legislation, "we 
blindly supported the initiative in the mistaken belief that it dealt only with violent 
crimes"). 
,.. Z IMRING ET AL., supra note 329, a t 43-46, 59. 
~ Jd. 
,.. ELLIOTT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 70-78 (1998). 
"" See, e.g., Vitiello, supra note 361, at 437-39. 
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reductions in crime at significantly lower cost.588 
Third, many Three Strikes felons, like Andrade and Romero, 
demonstrate a common pattern among repeat offenders. Both had a 
history of drug abuse that seemed to be connected with their criminal 
conduct.589 Cases likes theirs are common; a large number of repeat 
offenders have drug problems.590 Some drug treatment programs have 
proven effective and are far less expensive than the long prison terms 
required under Three Strikes.591 Targeting the right offenders, ones 
susceptible to successful drug treatment or other rehabilitative 
programs, results in significant savings without the human loss involved 
with Three Strikes sentences. 
Fourth, California's decline in the crime rate was not unique. Other 
states had similar declining crime rates without similar long terms of 
imprisonment.592 Instead, states like New York and Massachusetts 
followed policies that were far less expensive than California's massive 
investment in new prisons and the costs of filling and maintaining them. 
New York's approach included various policing strategies, including an 
aggressive approach to nuisance crimes and weapons possession.593 
Boston's approach included more effective policing and various 
community development and prevention programs.594 Those practices 
are less expensive alternatives to mass incarceration. In assessing what 
may have contributed to the decline in nationwide crime rates, Beres and 
Griffith suggested that various strategies may have all contributed to the 
drop in crime, including "[a] growth in community programs designed 
to prevent violence and to give juveniles a constructive alternative to 
delinquent behavior ... . "595 That is, an honest assessment of whether 
Three Strikes works must consider less expensive alternatives. Shifting 
resources from prison construction and maintenance to hiring more 
police may increase the certainty of punishment, even if the individual 
sentences are shortened.596 Shifting resources from prisons to proven 
"' /d. at 436-50. 
"" Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 2001); People v. Superior 
Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628, 632 (Cal. 1996). 
"" ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 329, at 76-80. 
,., See REITZ, supra no te 360, at 16-17. 
"" Beres & Griffith, supra note 463, at 128-29; Vitiello, supra note 499, at 269-70 . 
.,., Beres & Griffith, supra note 463, at 119-20. 
"" Jd. at 129-30. 
~ ld. 
""' Vitiello, supra note 361, at 442. While California has had a dramatic decline in its 
crime rate, so has New York where no three strikes law is in effect. In New York City, the 
police now make arrests for minor offenses, a s trategy that is credited with reducing crime. 
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rehabilitative programs is sound policy.597 
If recidivist statutes like Three Strikes are morally justified, it is 
because they reduce crime without undue cost. The emerging empirical 
data show that Three Strikes was ill-conceived because its benefits are 
uncertain and come at far too high a price. With that in mind, I want to 
discuss the possibility of reforming Three Strikes. Despite my 
conclusion that Andrade and Brown were result-oriented,598 they may 
have been California's best hope at reforming Three Strikes. 
V. REFORMING THREE STRIKES 
One obvious response to concerns about the need to reform Three 
Strikes is that the California legislature or voters should correct the 
problem. For example, one commentator has stated that the U.S. 
Supreme Court's refusal to overturn Three Strikes sentences "may be a 
blessing in disguise. Only state legislatures can eliminate draconian 
recidivist laws. No Supreme Court decision would do more than nibble 
at their edges."599 Yet a political solution may be chimerical. 
In Punishment and Democracy, the authors conclude that their empirical 
data, showing that Three Strikes has not delivered on its overblown 
promises, are unlikely to influence the public debate about the law.600 
Single-issue politicians now regard Three Strikes as "iconic 
orthodoxy."601 Single-issue groups on the other side of the issue are 
missing from the debate.602 The law, which requires a super-majority for 
its amendment, 603 has the support of strong political interests, such as the 
California Correctional Peace Officer's Association.604 Hence, a shift in 
The strategy has been suggested by a number of criminologists. See, e.g., George L. Kelling 
& James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 29, Mar. 1982, at 29 (arguing that 
tolerance of petty offenses leads to increased crime rates). This approach has numerous 
advantages over California's; not the least significant is that it comes at a lower cost. 
""' CURRIE, supra note 586, at 164-72; REITZ, s11pra note 360, at 17. 
"" See s11pra Part I. C. 
""' Frank 0. Bowman lll, Ewing v. California: The Supreme Court Takes 11 Walk on "Three 
Strikes" Laws . . . And Tlzat's Fine, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH SCHOOL OF LAW, JURIST, 
Opinion, Forum, Mar. 24,2003, available at http:/ / jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum 
/forumnew103.php. 
600 ZIMRING ET AL., s11pra note 329, at 217-32. 
601 ld. at 222. 
"" ld. at 221-22. 
"'' In the case of TI1ree Strikes, the initiative provides that the terms of the law can be 
changed only by two-thirds majority of both houses of the California legislature. CAL. 
PENAL CODE§ 667(j) (Deering 1994). 
"" Dana Wilkie, Prop 184: 3 Strikes Already on Books, Foes Say its Passage Only Bolsters 11 
Bad Law, SAN DI EGO UN!ON-TRIB., Oct. 12, 1994, at Al. The California Correctional Peace 
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public opmwn on the crime issue is not likely to lead to wholesale 
reform, because the shift would have to be substantial enough to create a 
super-majority. 
Further, they argue that this shift in public sentiment is not likely to 
take place.605 Part of Three Strikes' support comes from what the authors 
described as the legend about crime in California. Three Strikes is 
considered by many as a watershed change in penal policy.606 Despite 
substantial evidence to the contrary, Three Strikes is considered the shift 
from soft to hard on crime, leading to a downturn in crime.607 Empirical 
evidence will make little im£act on the public's confidence in the law. In 
effect, the law "feels right." 
Punishment and Democracy also argues that the closer that decisions 
about criminal punishment are to the electorate (and the further away 
from decision-making by experts) the more likely it is that punishment 
will increase.609 Political rhetoric has convinced voters that punishment 
is a "zero-sum competition between crime victims and criminal 
offenders."610 Many voters believe that they are choosing between 
victims and offenders, and that what is bad for offenders is necessarily 
d f . . 611 goo or v1chms. 
The short history since passage of Three Strikes supports their thesis. 
A few liberal legislators have submitted legislation to modify Three 
Strikes.612 None has been successful. Governor Davis vetoed even the 
bill that would have authorized a study of Three Strikes.613 Perhaps, 
California's current budget crisis will create a coalition of fiscal 
Officers Association's (CCPOA) $51,000 contribution provided the early financial support. 
"" ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 329, at 178-80. 
606 Jd. 
6117 !d . 
... ld. at 221-22. 
"" /d. 
610 ld. at 233. 
611 I d. 
612 For example, California Senator John Vasconcellos introduced S.B. 2048 in 1998, 
designed to limit the application of the Three Strikes statute to violent and serious offenses. 
The bill needed 27 votes to pass but received only 11 votes. S.B. 2048, 1997-98 Leg., Reg, 
Sess. (Cal. 1998). S.B. 1317 was a similar bill introduced in 1997 by Senator Barbara Lee. It 
received only 13 of the 27 necessary votes to proceed to the Assembly. S.B.1317, 1997-98 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997). More recently, Assembly Member Jackie Goldberg introduced 
a bill that would require that a current conviction be a "serious" or "violent" felony to 
receive a third-strike enhanced sentence. The bill was moved to the inactive file for the 
Assembly on June 14, 2003. See supra note 43. 
613 Veto Message ofS.B. 873, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000). 
2004] California's Three Strikes and We're Out 1101 
conservatives and social liberals willing to reform Three Strikes.614 
Governor Schwarzenegger has promised to appoint a commission to 
determine the feasibility of shutting some of California's prisons.615 
Whether the commission's agenda will include reforming Three Strikes 
is uncertain, but reform will be an uphill battle for reasons suggested by 
Punishment and Democracy. 
Elsewhere, I have argued that one route to modest reform of Three 
Strikes' worst excesses would be for the California Supreme Court to 
hold that some of the law's more extreme sentences violate the state's 
prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.616 At the same time, I 
observed that "in light of the unanimity of opinions from several courts 
of appeal, the Supreme Court has little incentive to grant review in a case 
raising the issue."617 But the court's reticence on the issue "is unfortunate 
because California has precedent upholding challenges brought on cruel 
or unusual punishment grounds."618 As I argued above, at least some 
Three Strikes sentences apgear to violate the court's holdings in cases 
like Lynch, Foss, and Dillon. 19 
While that line of cases remains on the books, the court's record on 
Three Strikes has varied. Its decision in Romero demonstrated fidelity to 
existing precedent, suggesting that the court might well follow its own 
cruel or unusual punishment case law.620 But in other cases, it has read 
Three Strikes begrudgingly. The court limited a trial court's discretion in 
deciding whether to strike prior felonies in order to avoid what would 
otherwise be a mandatory Three Strikes sentence.621 In another case, it 
held that two qualifying felonies that were part of the same transaction 
can be considered separate strikes, allowing imposition of a twenty-five-
'" Despite the current budget crisis, the Assembly once again placed an inactive status 
on a bill that would have placed before the voters an initiative to limit Three Strikes by 
requiring that the third strike be serious or violent. See supra note 43. The bill's proponents 
have argued the measure as one that would save California, suffering from a severe budget 
crisis, a half billion dollars a year in reduced cost of incarcerating third-strike defendants 
and over $1 billion in future prison construction costs. Cal. Assembly AB 112 Analysis for 
Assembly Committee, 2003-04 Reg. Sess. 1-2 (May 27, 2003) (nvni/nble nt 
http:/ lwww.leginfo.ca.gov lpublbilllasml ab_OlOl-01501 ab_112_cfa_20030527 _175744_ 
asm_comm.htrnl) [hereinafter AB 112 A1wlysis]. 
m Donald E. Coleman, Conflict in Confinement, THE FRESNO BEE, Feb. 8, 2004, avnilnble at 
http: I www. fresnobee.comllocal I r-indexlistl story I 8101687p-8958147 c.h tml. 
"' Vitiello, supra note 499, at 283. 
617 Jd. 
ttlll Id. 
619 See supra Part II. B. 
'"' People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628,638 (Cal. 1996). 
'" People v. Williams, 948 P.2d 424, 435-36 (Cal. 1998). 
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year-to-life sentence upon the offender's next felony conviction.622 
Elsewhere, the court had to decide whether section 667(c)(5) applies to 
third-strike defendants who must serve at least a minimum term of 
twenty-five years imprisonment. Section 667(c)(5) seems to state that a 
prisoner serving a Three Strikes sentence may earn up to a twenty 
percent reduction of his minimum term of imprisonment and so could 
have the minimum term of twenty-five years reduced to twenty years.623 
The court rejected that interpretation of the law.624 
I have argued elsewhere that the court's Romero decision honored 
precedent. In deciding to follow precedent, the justices must have been 
aware of the potential political backlash that would result from their 
decision.625 Since the mid-1980s, when a vigorous campaign against 
reelection of three state supreme court justices led to their ouster,626 
elected state judges must be aware that voting contrary to popular 
criminal justice policies is a risky business.627 Given that the cciurt is now 
dominated by justices appointed by Governors Deukmejian and Wilson, 
both law and order governors, one might be surprised that challenges to 
Three Strikes have faired as well as they have.628 Nonetheless, since 
Romero, the supreme court has not stepped into the breach. The court 
does not seem willing to get California out of its Three Strikes morass. 
Absent action by the state supreme court, the Assembly or a successful 
initiative, the Ninth Circuit may have been California's best hope. 
Despite a 5-4 vote, Andrade was not a surprising decision: the AEDPA 
created too high a barrier. Ewing was a tougher case.629 
"' People v. Benson, 954 P .2d 557,560-70 (Cal. 1998). 
64
' "The total amount of credits awarded pursuant to Article 2.5 (commencing with 
Section 2930) of Chapter 7 of Title 1 of Part 3 shall not exceed one-fifth of the total term of 
imprisonment imposed and shall not accrue until the defendant is physically placed in the 
state prison." CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667(c)(5) (Deering 2003). The sentence reduction applies 
only to offenders sentenced under the law's second-strike, but not third-strike provisions. 
624 f11 re Cervera, 16 P.3d 176, 178-80 (Cal. 2001). 
"" For example, one reporter noted that for the system to work, judges must be "denied 
the discretion to unilaterally reduce mandatory sentences in the 'amorphous interest of 
justice."' He further explained that judges rarely stand for election and are "too often 
enthralled with the liberal paradigm equating 'judicial independence' and 'fairness' with 
leniency to criminals." James F. Sweeney, Foul Ball, NAT'L. REV., Aug 12, 1996, at 1,1. 
'" ZJMRlNG ET AL., supra note 329, at 128; Pfingst, Thompson & Lewis, supra note 31, at 
726-27. 
621 ZIMRlNG ET AL., supra note 329, at 129. 
628 For a discussion of how the Three Strikes law faired in the California Supreme 
Court, see ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 329, at 128-29. 
'"' Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 32-35 (2003). Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion 
offers s trong arguments in favor of a finding that some Three Strikes sentences violate the 
Eighth Amendment. ld. at 35. 
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The facts in Ewing were nowhere near as persuasive as were those in 
Andrade, where counsel was able to draw a close analogy to Solem's 
facts.630 But Ewing did not have to overcome the additional procedural 
""' See supra note 165. By contrast, Ewing's record included a crime of violence, was 
more extensive than Andrade's, and his third strike was not petty theft. As summarized by 
the plurality: 
On parole from a 9-year prison term, petitioner Gary Ewing walked into the pro 
shop of the El Segundo Golf Course in Los Angeles County on March 12, 2000. 
He walked out with three golf clubs, priced at $399 apiece, concealed in his pants 
leg. A shop employee, whose suspicions were aroused when he observed Ewing 
limp out of the pro shop, telephoned the police. The police apprehended Ewing 
in the parking lot. 
Ewing is no stranger to the criminal justice system. In 1984, at the age of 22, he 
pleaded guilty to theft. The court sentenced him to six months in jail 
(suspended), three years' probation, and a $300 fine. In 1988, he was convicted of 
felony grand theft auto and sentenced to one year in jail and three years' 
probation. After Ewing completed probation, however, the sentencing court 
reduced the crime to a misdemeanor, permitted Ewing to withdraw his guilty 
plea, and dismissed the case. In 1990, he was convicted of petty theft with a prior 
and sentenced to 60 days in the county jail and three years' probation. In 1992, 
Ewing was convicted of battery and sentenced to 30 days in the county jail and 
two years' summary probation. One month later, he was convicted of theft and 
sentenced to 10 days in the county jail and 12 months' probation. In January 
1993, Ewing was convicted of burglary and sentenced to 60 days in the county 
jail and one year's summary probation. In February 1993, he was convicted of 
possessing drug paraphernalia and sentenced to six months in the county jail 
and three years' probation. In July 1993, he was convicted of appropriating lost 
property and sentenced to 10 days in the county jail and two years' summary 
probation. In September 1993, he was convicted of unlawfully possessing a 
firearm and trespassing and sentenced to 30 days in the county jail and one 
year's probation. 
In October and November 1993, Ewing committed three burglaries and one 
robbery at a Long Beach, California, apartment complex over a 5-week period. 
He awakened one of his victims, asleep on her living room sofa, as he tried to 
disconnect her video cassette recorder from the television in that room. When 
she screamed, Ewing ran out the front door. On another occasion, Ewing 
accosted a victim in the mailroom of the apartment complex. Ewing claimed to 
have a gun and ordered the victim to hand over his wallet. When the victim 
resisted, Ewing produced a knife and forced the victim back to the apartment 
itself. While Ewing rifled through the bedroom, the victim fled the apartment 
screaming for help. Ewing absconded with the victim's money and credit cards. 
On December 9, 1993, Ewing was arrested on the premises of the apartment 
complex for trespassing and lying to a police officer. The knife used in the 
robbery and a glass cocaine pipe were later found in the back seat of the patrol 
car used to transport Ewing to the police station. A jury convicted Ewing of first-
degree robbery and three counts of residential burglary. Sentenced to nine years 
and eight months in prison, Ewing was paroled in 1999. 
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hurdle and so could argue that, as a matter of first impression, his 
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.631 
Ewing failed to produce a majority opinion. Justices Scalia632 and 
Thomas633 argued that the Eighth Amendment does not extend to terms 
of imprisonment. Justice O'Connor's three-person plurality left intact 
proportionality review, reaffirming Justice Kennedy's approach in 
Harmelin.634 The plurality found that Ewing's twenty-five-year-to-life 
sentence was lawful for several reasons. Justice O'Connor found 
legitimate the state's interest in increasing punishment for repeat 
offenders and cited traditional deference to state legislatures in making 
rational policy choices.635 She underscored that Ewin&,'s punishment was 
for a career of crime, not simply for this third strike. But, according to 
the plurality, "[e]ven standing alone, Ewing's theft should not be taken 
lightly."637 Nowhere does the plurality state that Solem turns on the fact 
that Helm was not eligible for Esarole, but the opinion analogizes Ewing's 
situation to that of Rummel's. In context, the plurality suggests that a 
twenty-five-year sentence is not so long that it creates a presumption of 
gross disproportionality that would compel examination of intra- and 
interjurisdictional comparisons.639 While the plurality opinion leaves 
open some questions about the scope of proportionality review,640 it 
Only 10 months later, Ewing stole the golf clubs at issue in this case. He was 
charged w ith, and ultimately convicted of, one count of felony grand theft of 
personal property in excess of $400. 
Ew ing, 538 U.S. at 17-19. 
631 Eu;ing, 538 U.S. at 14. 
632 ld. at 31. 
633 Td. at 32. 
._,. Td. at 20, 23-24 . 
'" ld. at 25. 
.,. /d. at 28 . 
.,, /d . 
. ,.. ld. at 29-30. 
"" That conclusion is implicit in the plurality's reliance on Rummel. Justice O'Connor's 
opinion does not state that the Court's proportionality review will succeed only if, at a 
minimum, the offender receives a true life sentence. As a result, in theory at least, some 
terms of imprisonment, short of true life, may be unconstitutional. ld. 
""' The opinion leaves open whether a sentence like Andrade's might have been 
unconstitutional. Because of the procedural posture of that case, the Court did not address 
whether, as a matter of Eighth Amendment law, his 50-year-to-life sentence was grossly 
disproportionate. 
Another question that the plurality does not address is whether a prisoner like 
Ewing might successfully raise a constitutional challenge if California does not release him 
after he has served 25 years. During oral argument, at least some of the justices in dicated 
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leaves little room to believe that California can rely on the judiciary to 
reform Three Strikes.641 
That is unfortunate. As discussed above, voters have not been willing 
to reform the situation that was partly their creation.642 The California 
courts had the means to avoid some of the worst results under Three 
Strikes by applying state precedent.643 The courts of appeal have not 
done so and the supreme court has put off deciding the question. 
Andrade and Brown were result-oriented,644 but the Ninth Circuit 
served its institutional purpose. Debate exists about the precise role of 
federal courts. Critics focus on the fact that federal judges are not elected 
and serve for life, immune from the political process.645 As a result, 
critics contend that federal court rulings are anti-democratic.646 
Proponents counter that federal courts serve a special role in protecting 
the rights of minorities and are a check against mob rule.647 At a 
their belief that, of course, California will routinely release prisoners when they have 
served their minimum term. 5. Ct. Off. Transcr. Oral Argument at 23, Ewing v. California, 
538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
Given the cost of maintaining aging felons and the limited risk that older felons 
present, that conclusion is plausible. That is not a foregone conclusion. Not discussed is a 
difficult question: at what point, short of the prisoner's death, can the prisoner show that 
the state intends to keep him in prison for a true life sentence? If Rummel, not Solem, 
controls Ewing because Helm had to serve a true life sentence, how will a court determine 
when a sentence with a statutory minimum term becomes a true life sentence? Cf In re 
Rodriguez, 537 P.2d 384,651-57 (Cal. 1975) . 
.. 
1 One commentator suggests that a contrary holding in Ewing would have amounted 
to nibbling at the edges. See Bowman, supra note 599. That is debatable. For example, the 
analysis done in connection with AB 112 estimates that about 350 prisoners faced similar 
sentences based on a third s trike of "petty theft with a prior." AB 112 Analysis, supra note 
614, at 4. Had the Court adopted Judge Karlton's view, focusing on the third strike and 
extending Brown to cases not involving "wobblers," Duran v. Castro, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 
1127 (E.D. Cal. 2002), Ewing would have had a far more sweeping effect. For example, AB 
112's analysis indicates that over 670 offenders are serving Three Strikes sentences for 
possession of controlled substances. AB 112 Analysis, supra note 614, at 4. 
'" Supra note 612 . 
.. , See supra Part ll.B. 
... See supra Part I. C. 
""' Basile J. Uddo, Tire Human Life Bill: Protecting the Unborn Througlz Congressional 
Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 LOY. L. REV. 1079, 1079-80 (1981) (stating that, 
"abortion was foisted upon the American people by an unelected, life-tenured judiciary, 
and not adopted by the deliberate workings of the more representative political process"). 
... Id.; Janiskee & Erler, supra note 516, at 56, 61; Vitiello, supra note 516, at 615-16, 622 . 
.. , See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("(F]rom the natural feebleness of 
the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its 
coordinate branches; and. . . nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and 
independence as permanency in office."); see also MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER, 50-52 (2d ed. 1990) 
(discussing policy favoring Article ill over legislative courts). 
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minimum, federal courts have a special role where the political process 
does not serve well to protect the public good.648 
Implicit in my analysis above is that Three Strikes is an example of a 
situation in which the political process does not serve the public 
interest.649 That a super-majority is required to reform Three Strikes 
means that the democratic process may not be able to cure the law's 
excesses.
650 Elsewhere, I have written extensively on how the public was 
seriously misled during adoption of Three Strikes.651 The campaign in 
favor of Three Strikes was so misleading that it left grave doubts as to 
whether the voters knew what they were voting for;652 many voters have 
subsequently expressed surprise when they have learned that the law 
applies to cases like Andrade's.653 The campaign for its passage would 
have been unsuccessful without Polly Klaas's highly publicized 
kidnapping and subsequent murder.654 Politicians and the public acted 
out of blind passion in enacting Three Strikes; little rational debate 
occurred that would have limited the law's excesses.655 
These kinds of circumstances justify the intervention of an 
independent judiciary. As explained by the California Supreme Court in 
Lynch, courts should give deference to legislative prerogative in 
establishing criminal punishments.656 But the court must intervene when 
"isolated excessive penalties may occasionally be enacted through 
'honest zeal' generated in response to transitory public emotion."657 That 
language describes the passage of Three Strikes. From this perspective, 
the Ninth Circuit got it right in Andrade and Brown. The Ninth Circuit 
may have been California's best hope for a modest reform of some of 
Three Strikes' excesses. 
"' REDISH, supra note 647. 
"' See supra notes 642-48 and accompanying text. 
"" CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667(j) (West 2004). 
"
1 See generally Vitiello, supra note 362; Vitiello, supra note 516. 
'" Vitiello, supra note 513, a t 619-20. 
053 60 Minutes, supra note 2; All Thirrgs Considered, "Three Strikes" (NPR radio broadcas t, 
Apr. 6, 2002). 
'" Vitiello, supra note 361, at 409-12. 
OS! Jd. 
'"' En re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 923-24 (Cal. 1972). 
"' Id. at 931-32 (quoting Weems v . U.S., 217 U.S. 349,373 (1910)). 
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CONCLUSION 
Judges may be open to criticism when their decisions are result-
oriented, departing from settled law to reach a desired result.658 I have 
argued that both the Ninth Circuit and the California district courts of 
appeal are open to that criticism in their decisions relating to Three 
Strikes. Andrade and Brown interpreted U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
expansively.659 The court did so despite the procedural context of those 
cases: on review in habeas corpus cases, the court can reverse a state 
court judgment only when the state court unreasonably applied clearly 
established U.S. Supreme Court precedent.660 Given the number of 
unresolved questions that the Ninth Circuit had to decide to reach its 
conclusion, the court had to stretch to conclude that clear precedent 
dictated its result.661 
The California appellate courts' interpretation of California's 
prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment were similarly result-
oriented.662 Those decisions focused on the offender's status as a repeat 
offender and ignored state supreme court precedent that suggested 
contrary answers to issues resolved against the Three Strikes 
defendants.663 
Given that both federal and state courts have not given a fair reading 
to precedent, this Article has explored whether in this case, the public 
was better served by the federal or the state courts. Recidivist statutes 
are on a questionable moral foundation to begin with.664 At best, they are 
justified if they produce more social good than harm.665 But empirical 
data now demonstrate that Three Strikes simply cannot deliver as 
prornised.666 Politicians have not backed away from their ardent support 
of Three Strikes; no interest group has the resources and visibility to 
reform Three Strikes.667 The failure of the political process has left little 
hope for reform.668 The Ninth Circuit's decisions, while fairly narrow in 
""' Charles J. Ogletree, judicial Activism or judicial Necessity: Tire D.C. District Court's 
Criminal Justice Legacy, 90 GEO. L.J. 685,689 n.12 (2002). 
""' Supra Part I. C. 
"" 28 u.s. c.§ 2254(d)(l) (2003). 
66
' See supra Part I. C. 
"' See supra Part li.A. 
663 See supra Part II.A. 
,.. See supra Part lll. 
665 Supra notes 454-58. 
... Supra Part IV. 
667 ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 329, at 220-22. 
MlJ ld. 
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scope,669 created the opportunity for modest reform to Three Strikes. 
Ewing and Andrade dashed that hope. 
""' Both A11drade and Brown involved "wobblers," cases that may be charged either as 
misdemeanors or felonies. The analysis seemed to focus on that fact. In addition, so too 
did Justice Stevens opinion in Riggs v. California, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999). If that fact turns out 
to be controlling, those decisions will be quite narrow and will not address cases like 
Romero in which the defendant's final felony was possession of narcotics or similar cases 
where the felon's third strike is relatively minor and does not threaten physical harm. 
